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PREFACE 
. The Nanking Incident of March-24, 1927, was only an obscure event 
in the long tqdn of China's past, but in its few. hours of terror, the 
Incident captured the essence of the forces seeking to remold China 
during the Nationalist Revolution. This study seeks to explore the 
j.mpact of the N,anking. Incident on the diplo.rilatic and · cultural 
aspects of Sino-American relations. At first glance, this project seems 
simple enough to execute since it is an examination of such a minute 
segment of Chinesehistory, but without the aid and assistance of many 
indiv:i.duals, this thesis would not have· become a reality. 
Of particular assistance were the librarians of the Inter-library 
, Loan Department of the Oklahoma State.University Library, whose ready 
assistance and sense of humor helped clear many a research hurdle. 
Gratitude is also expressed to the various.Protestant mission officers 
and librarians, especially Mrs. Elsie Lund, Librarian for the Board of 
Missions of the Methodist Church~ Miss Madeline Brown of the United 
Presbyterian Mission Lf.brary, and Joseph M. Smith, Executive Secretary 
of the .United Chrf.st:i.an Missionary Soc:i.ety. Through their aid several 
missionaries who were in Nanking.during the 1927 Incident were contac-
ted. Among the mis.sionaries providing important personal contributions 
· to this thesis w~re Dr. M. Searle Bates (Disciples of Christ), the 
Reverend LymanL. Hale (Methodist), Dr. C, S. Trimmer (Methodist), Dr. 
Clarence H. Hamilton (Disciples of Christ), and the Reverend William F. 
iii 
Hummell (Methodist). 'Dr. i 'Ray,·,:Six (Disciplei's of 01\1:'fist) provided valu-
able information. Ort thec).Nankirtg missionary cbmmiih:i.ty in 1927 0 
In addition to the1'h.~lp' received 'outsi"d·e the.·acadeinic community, 
the author has receivedinuch inspiration arid guidance from Dr. Alfred 
Leyin and 'Dr. Sidney D, Brown. 
Despite the advice, consultation, and material aid provided, the 
final conclusions and presentation are the work of the author, and as 
such he takes full responsibility for any· errors. in fact. or }:listorical 
judgment t_hat may appear in this study. 
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INl'RO DUCT LON 
In mid-1926, the Kuomintang government at Canton sent its armies 
north to unseat the "warlord" government at Peking, thus precipitating 
the Chinese Nationalist Revolution. By early 1927, Nationalist armies 
of the Kuomintang controlled half of China and were nearing the strate-
gic cities of Shanghai and Nanking in the lower Yangtze valley. 
The capture of Nanking took place on Thursday, March 24, 1927, 
amidst anti-foreign looting, pillaging, and murder. On that day of vio-
lence, soldiers, described as Nationalists, killed six foreigners and 
wounded several others. Not a Great Power was spared, and victims of 
the violence included nationals of Great Britain, the United States, 
France, Japan, and Italy. 
How then would the Powers react to the Incident? Would.they use 
force against the Nationalist government.as they normally had in the 
past when Chinese attacked foreign. property or persons? · This "gun boat" 
diplomacy of decades past had progressively. sa.ddled China with an un-
equal treaty system that gave foreigners innumerable privileges in 
. China. Even the idealism g'enerated at the Washington Confei;-ence brought 
only limited surrender of these privileges. 1 Now terror at Nanking in 
1927 propelled the Kuomintang into total confrontation with the old 
treaty structure created by the Powers. 
1Dorothy Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, (New 
York, MacMillan Co., 1947), 419. 
1 
2 
The old conservative position had become increasingly difficult for 
the Powers to maintain after World War I as China developed a strong 
national sense. Modern Chinese nationalism, in fact, had its birth in 
China's diplomatic defeat at the Versailles Conference at which Japan 
rather than Chinawon control of the German concessions in Shantung. 
When news of this defeat reached Peking on May 4, 1919, an an.ti-foreign 
backlash developed among Chinese students. Demonstrations and boycotts 
against foreigners occurred throughout China. The student sponsored 
anti-foreign movement soon spawned a nationalist movement that came to 
be dominated by the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party. 
How should the West deal with the Kuomintang and its demands for 
treaty revision and diplomatic equality for China? Two schools of 
thought dominated. On the one hand stood. the conservatives who favored 
the continuance of the treaty system in total opposition to the Kuomin-
tang. On the other hand gathered those of moderate opinion who sympa-
thized with China's desire to end foreign domination. To the moderates, 
the Kuomintang represented China's greatest hope for unity and strength. 
To the conservatives, the Nationalists were Bolsheviks who wished to 
turn China "red." 
The chief spokesman for the conservative lobby was a British paper, 
the North China Herald, published at Shanghai. The· Herald represented 
the business. interests which had formed local Chambers of Commerce in 
China's major cities; and it spoke for those foreign.businessmen who 
feared that the Nationalists would destroy trade through unionization of 
the Chinese proletariat and confiscation or destruction of foreign prop-
erty. The Nationalists confirmed these foreign fears with their seizure 
of concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang. early in 1927 .. Most fore:i,gn 
diplomats in China also favored the system of continued privileges 
because they regarded China as incapable of developing a national gov-
ernment that could protect foreign life and property. With them, as 
3 
part of the conservative cabal, stood the foreign military forces in 
China. Gunboats and marines provided the physical force that supported 
special privileges, 
Against these upholders of the privileges inherited from the past 
were arrayed the moderates--chiefly American Protestant missionaries. 
The home boards were nearly unanimous in favoring the Nationalist cause 
and drastic revision of the treaty system, though missionary opinion in 
the field was less united. 2 Protestant missionaries generally favored 
the Nationalist cause, particularly those savers of souls whose denomi-
nations adhered to modern theological currents. The fundamentalists, 
however, often clashed with the revolutionaries, particularly when they 
demanded more techn:i.cal training and less religion in the mission 
schools. These missionaries did not react kindly to pressures to put 
school administration into the hands of Chinese, The native clergy 
sought to grasp power prematurely, in the view of these China mission-
aries, who looked to the treaty system as a safeguard against government 
interference. Even so, on the balance the Protestant missionaries sup-
ported Chinese nationalism. 3 
Such support came into focus through the only representative body 
of Protestantism in China, the National Christian Council. A variety 
of China-based institutions and denominations such as the Peking 
2Ibid., 83, 
3Ibid., 84, 
Missionary Society, Methodist missions, Congregationalists,. Northern 
Baptists, and Northern Presbyterians, joined the National Christian 
Council in giving unanimous support to the moderate position, 
4 
Significantly, the American rather than the British newspapers up-
held the moderate attitude in China, One was the Peking Leader, and 
another was J, B. Powell's China Weekly Review, published in Shanghai, 
Powell was so violent in his attacks on foreign imperialism in China 
that the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce expelled him a few weeks after the 
Nanking Incident. 4 The principal voice for moderation in American pol-
itics was that of the redoubtable Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee,. William E. Borah (Republican, Idaho). Borah was virtu-
al a st for the Kuomintang. 
Fundamentally then~ the controversy over what might be called the 
China Problem involved two groups--the Protestant missionaries and their 
American Boards, versus the foreign businessmen, diplomats, and military 
personnel in China. The latter--those advocates of the conservative 
view--had long dominated and theirs was the official policyof the Powers 
until 1928. In July, 1928, only a year after the Nanking Incident, the 
United.States reversed its China policy and adopted a moderate stance, 
The Sino--American Tariff Treaty, signed at that time, was the vehicle 
for .this basic change as it provided the basis for American recognition 
of the Nationalist government. 
This shift in United States China policy seems surprising in its 
proximity to the violence at Nanking a year earlier. If the National-
ists contributed to the deaths of foreigners and the loss of foreign 
4North China Herald, (April 30, 1927), 209. 
5 
property, one might expect a revival of the gun boat policy. Instead~ 
the United States acted in a spirit of conciliation and recognized the 
authority of the new regime. Here, then, is the paradox: that the 
United States,. while smarting under the violence of the Nanking Incident, 
turned its policy toward conciliation of China. 
Was it plausible, as Editor J. B. P0well asserted, that the Ameri-
can diplomatic response to the Nanking Incident was the watershed point 
in the development of moderate policy toward Chinese Nationalism? 5 This 
paper will examine that thesis. Moreover, it will reconstruct the event 
to ascertain its sources and possible causes. Finally, the paper will 
deal with the Incident's impact on the cultural molders of American 
opinion on Ch.:i.na, the Protestant missionaries and American literary 
figures. 
· 
5China Weekly Review, (May 14, 1927), 272. 
CHAPTER I 
PRELUDE TO TERROR 
The terror of March 24, 1927, was nothing new to Nanking; armies 
had marched and counter-marched through this ancient capital city since 
its founding in the sixth century, BoCo Twice it served Imperial dy-
nasties as capital--the Eastern Chin in the fourth century, and the Ming 
in the fourteenth century O More recently. the Taiping Rebels had seized 
the city and made it their capital for a decadeo 1 
It was in the Taiping era that foreigners first arrived inNanking 
after the Tientsin treaties (June 26, 1858) opened the Yangtze River 
ports to foreign commerce, The first visitors to Nanking were merchants 
who settled in northern Nanking near the Yangtze port faci1ities, They 
developed a variety of foreign business establishments along or near 
the waterfronto After 1880, Protestant missionaries settled in the city, 
with the China Inland Mission in the vanguardo Members of the mission 
community lived among the native population, congregating in the vicin-
ity of the Drum Tower in the center of the city, 2 
By the mid-1920' s Nanking was a thriving commercial and mis.sion 
post, but the Chinese Nationalist Revolution began to interfere with the 
1E. L Osgood and Edwin Marx, The China Christian Mission (Indian-
apolis,. Mission Press, 1936), 5, 
2New York Times, (March 25, 1927), 20 
6 
7 
life of the city. River traffic and trade noticeably decreased in late 
1926 after the Nationalists captured the upriver cities of Changsha and 
Hankow, As the Kuomintang armies approached Nanking, the native popula--
tion became nervous and unstable. The people remembered the tragedy of 
earlier wars when Nanking had been besieged and starved, and evidence 
of the destruction during the Taiping Rebellion sixty years earlier, 
when the city was nearly destroyed, was still evident. 
When nearby Kiukiang fell to the Kuomintang on November 4, 1926, 
the Chinese deserted Nanking en masse. The Nationalists had besieged 
Wuchang earlier, and that city had held out at great cost to the city's 
population. The Wuchang garrison capitulated on October 10, after the 
commander had been bought off by the Nationalists. Thus, the fears of 
Nanking's citizens were further heightened. Sun Ch'uan-fang, the War-
lord of Kiangsu Province· where Nanking was located, stabilized the com-
bat line through the winter, and although the Chinese returned, they 
3 had lost all confidence in the NorthernWarlord cause. 
· The foreign community had similar fears of siege, but there was 
greater concern that retreating Northern troops would loot and pillage 
foreign property. By contrast foreigners had little distrust of the 
Kuomintang, for they expected the victorious army to protect its newly 
conquered territory. British Consul Bertram Giles particularly feared 
that retreating Northern troops might loot foreign property. Although 
he foresaw endless trouble from the Kuomintang over boycotts and agita-
tion, he did not expect any direct attacks on foreigners. Giles 
3Alice T. Hobart, Within the Walls of Nanking (New York, MacMillan 
Co., 1929), 104. 
8 
reflected an attitude widespread in the foreign community. 4 
Thus, uncertainty gripped Nari.king l!ls the N~titlnalist armies ap-
proa~hed in early 1927. Ih P~bttiarys 1927, Gerietal iun's eastern front 
collapsed, and he sought ~elp from the Peking governmertt, t:h.en dominated 
by the Warlords Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu. 5 Peking sent General Chang 
Chung-chang with 100, 0000 Chihli-- Shantung troops and White Rus_sian mer-
cenaries to Nanking in mid-March, and General Chu Yu-pu took command of 
h . 6 t e CLty. Meanwhile Sun _Ch' uan-fang secretly retreated from Nanking 
7 
on March 18. 
Up to March 21, Nanking residents thought that Northern troops 
were holding a line 30 miles south of the city. However, sounds of 
artillery.and machine-gun fire-very near the city on the evening of the 
8 21,st dispelled illusions of safety. The next morning at 6:30, British 
and American officials with the help of missionaries and businessmen 
began to evacuate the foreign women and children onto gunboats in the 
Nari.king -anchorage. 9 They placed the foreign dependents aboard the 
HMS.,, !;.merald and the ~ Noa already at anchor and on the USS W. B. 
Preston which soon arrived fromWuhu to aid in the evacuation. lO One 
4Pap·ers Relating_!£ the Nanking Incident of March 24 and 25, 1927 
(London, H.M. Stationary Office, 1927), 7. _Hereafter referred to as 
British Nanking Papers. 
-
5H b o art, 
6B . - . h rLtLS 
Nanking, 157-159. 
Nariking Papers, 12. 
7China Weekly Review, (March 26, 1927), 6. 
8L d r·· on·on Lmes, (March 28, 1927), 14. 
9British_NankingPapers~ 6. 
lOibid. , 13. 
9 
hundred seventy-three American women and children left the city. Thirty 
of them travelled to Shanghai aboard the river steamer Pi Yap.g_ in the 
f · 1 w· 1 · · h 11 company o sixty otner estern women, most y Br1.t1.s . The remaining 
American women stayed aboard the~ and Preston at Nanking. 12 Yet 
American women were notably uncooperative with the evacuation program; 
and many missionary wives preferred to stay with their husbands in the 
city. By contrast only six British women stayed behind, four at or near 
the British consulate, one at Ginling College, and one in Hsiakwan, 
Nanking's port city. 13 
For foreigners who remained in the city--men as well as women--
protection was minimal. The British tried to send an armed detachment 
of forty men to guard the consulate, but Northern officials turned them 
back at the city gates. Later in the day, the Americans and British 
were able to bring small numbers of marines into the city armed only 
with side arms. Eventually eighteen soldiers arrived at the British 
consulate and eleven at the American consulate where they received 
. f'l 14 r1. · es. For communication between these tiny forces and the gunboats 
the USS Noa dispatched two signalmen to Socony Hill, located in northern 
Nanking near the city wall. The first arrived on the 22nd, and the 
second accompanied a detachment of six marines from the W. B. Preston 
11Ibid., 7. 
12Pape~ Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1927, (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1942), 
Volume II, 152. This volume hereafter referred to as Foreign Relations, 
1927. 
13B ' ' h N k' P 6 r1.t1.s an 1.n_g apers, • 
14Ibid. , 7. 
10 
the next day. 15 Altogether, these troops formed a very thin screen 
around the remaining foreign populace, 
The Chinese also joined the ranks of the foreign refugees and began 
evacuating the city even while the Northern troops streamed through the 
city in the opposite direction to the front. Indeed, the exodus began 
while the Northern government seemed firmly in control of Nanking. In 
a show of strength on the 22nd, its forces carried out a raid against 
Kuomintang sympathizers. Shantung troops arrested twenty students from 
three universities, and summarily executed them by decapitation, placing 
h b d . d' 1 ' N · 1 · 16 t e o ies on isp ay as a warning to ationa ist supporters. 
Meantime, the firing heard late Monday and early, Tuesday gradually 
diminished, but suddenly at about 3:00 p.m., Wednesday, March 23, the 
Northern army retreated from the front en masse, At the South Gate of 
Nanking observers witnessed the odd spectacle'of orderly troops march-
ing to battle and being passed by frenzied troops in full retreat. 17 
A minor Northern defeat several miles south of Nanking at Ta Ming-
18 fu precipitated the rout. White Russian mercenaries, only a few hun-
dred in number,, had entered the battle quite aggressively, only to be 
cut off from the main body of Northern defenders. The Kuomintang then 
destroyed the outnumbered Russians, and on seeing this, the Shantung 
troops broke from battle. The Russians had provided moral courage for 
the Chinese in battle, and with their destruction, Chinese morale 
15Foreign Relations, 1927, 152., 
16China_Weekly Review, (March 28, 1927), 6. 
17British Nankin_g Papers, 13. 
18London Times, (March 28, 1927), 14. 
11 
collapsed. 
The victor at TaMing-fu was General Ch'eng Ch'ienwhose National-
19 ist force was composed of units of the Sixth Nationalist Army. The 
soldiers· of these units were mostly. from Kiangsi and Hunan, but a hand-
ful came from Kwangtung province. General Chang Hui-chan commanded the 
Fourth Division which led the assault and spearheaded the entry into 
N k . 20 an Lng . 
. The Kuomintang Army, had surprised the Northerners on Monday evening 
by stealthily bringing an artillery battery to within a few miles of 
Nanking. The opening salvos of this battery, heard in the city, had 
launched the battle and caused the early panic in Nanking. 21 The 
Nationalists had been unable to hold this early position, but by Wednes-
day afternoon, the 23rd, a Nationalist victory was certain. By 5:00 
p.m. Northern observers spotted the advancing Kuomintang troops three 
or four miles from Nanking, 22 
The retreating Northerners, many fresh and untouched by battle, 
reached Nanking about 4:00 p.m. and poured through the city's southern 
gates until about 9:00when the gates were closed, Approximately 20,000 
Northern troops entered Nanking during this time. There were so many 
that, according to British Consul Giles, they were "packed like sardines 
1123 for over a mile back of the North Gate, · 
19r 1 ang Leang-li, The Inner History.of the Chinese Revolution 
(New York, Dutton and Co., 1930), 249-253. 
ZOB ' 'h N k' P 18 rLtLs . an Lng apers, . 
21London Times, (March 28, 1927), 14. 
22British Nanking Papers, 13. 
23Ibid., 7. 
12 
After the city gates closed, the troops circled the city to reach 
transportation across the Yangtze. The Northerners reached the bund 
and filled the area by 6:00 p.m. Because of the lack of transportation 
facilities, the force soon became a riot-prone mob. Northern officers 
used bombs and machine gun fire to control the unruly troops, but they 
could not contain the disorders and fires which flared throughout Hsia~ 
kwan, Nanking's port ci:ty. Only when they commandeered China Merchant 
Steamship Company vessels for more rapid removal of the 'Northern troops 
did rioting 24 cease, By midnight nearly 60,000 Northern soldiers had 
crossed the river, and sixteen trainloads of troops had left Pukow, on 
25 the north bank of the Yangtze. 
Generally, the Northern troops did little looting in Nanking, They 
pillaged only two deserted foreign homes and forced two Britons to give 
up their wallets on Wednesday evening. For the most part foreigners 
had remained near their consulates or gunboats for protection, but six 
foreigners who were trapped in the route of the retreat were unharmed. 
By one report the Nanking Chamber of Commerce paid a $500,000 bribe to 
h N h d 1 ' 26 If h t e ort ern comman er to prevent oot1.ng, . so, t e maneuver sue-
ceeded; for by 11:30 p,m., the night of March 23rd, all firing had 
ceased, and the city remained intact, Few Northerners were seen on Nan-
k • I 27 1.ng s streets, 
Thus, Nanking was troubled neither by Northern rioting nor by 
24Ibid., 13-14, 
25 London Times, (March 28, 1927), 14, 
26 rbi.d. 
27 
.. h N k" P 7 Br1.t1.s an 1.ng apers, . 
Kuomintang seige, and the first newspaper accounts of the Kuomintang 
occupation reported that Nanking was captured without disturbance. 28 
Later events did not support this optimistic view of the occupation. 
28washington Post, (March 24, 1927), 4. 
13 
CHAPTER II 
THE DAY OF TERROR: MARCH 24, 1927 
The Nationalist Army entered Nanking_by three southern gates at 
dawn,, March 24, 1927. , Many American qiis_sionari.es sympathetic with the 
Nationalist cause had. w€1,ited anxiously. for this mom~nt. · Among the. more 
enthusiastic was Dr. John E.- Williams (Presbyterian), Vice President of 
Nanki.ng,Uni.versi.ty, who had many. friends among the Kuomintang_ leaders. 1 
, Will;l.ams. knew that many changes would take place with the arrival of 
the Nationalists, and yet he felt that the transition from. the old to 
new order could be eased with .the counsel and work of older men like 
himself. · As Dr, Williams dressed that morning, he remarked to his wife, 
"I have a strange feeling as. though we have been left here to do some 
special work for such a ti.me as this; I feel as though I can do some-
thing. for China now. 112 
Shortly before 8:00 a.m., Dr. Willi.ams arrived. at the university 
to conduct chapel exercises, but before services started, a Chinese 
. tea.cher, Lawrence Lew, told him that a missionary's house- was being 
looted. When Dr. Williams and several other university officials· went 
to investigate, Nationalist soldiers captured them; The soldiers were 
· 
1Nanki.ng University was jointly operated by several mission groups 
-including the Methodists, Presbyterians, and Disciples. 
2w. R. Wheeler,, John E. Willi.ams of Nanki.ng (New York, F. H, Revell 
-. Company, 1931), 173. ----
. 14 
15 
in an ugly mood, and their leader was heard to say, "Tah tao wai kwoh 
ren! Tah tao ti kwoh chu i!" (Down with foreigners! Down with im-
perialism!) 
The soldiers searched the prisoners for weapons and took their 
valuables. In an effort to save his watch, Dr. Williams remarked in a 
friendly, half-joking way in Chinese, "You don't want to take that do 
you? The watch isn't worth much, but my mother gave it to me, and I 
would like to keep it." The leader of the soldiers. immediately turned, 
and firing from the hip, shot Dr. Williams through the temple. The 
3 
soldier then seized the watch from the dead man. The day of terror 
had begun, and Kuomintang troops systematically looted mission property 
and robbed missionary personnel. 
Protestant Missions 
.At about the same time as the murder of Dr. Williams, Kuomintang 
troops entered the Presbyterian Girls School and adjoining staff houses. 
located in the Drum Tower region. At one of these houses a soldier 
robbed three missionaries of more than $1100. He became enraged when 
the missionaries could give him no more money and began to shoot wildly, 
wounding one of the missionaries, Miss Anna Moffett, in the knee and 
abdomen. Fortunately the other two missionaries escaped injury and fled 
4 to hiding places. 
Miss Moffett eventually escaped and hid in straw in a workers' shed 
at the Presbyterian school. She did not receive medical aid until about 
,3 
Ibid., 13-27. 
4 Personal papers of L. Lyman Hale, Paper VII, 3-7. Hereafter re-
ferred to as Hale Collection. 
16 
10:00 p.m. when Chinese friends found her and moved her to Bailie Hall 
on the Nan.king Uni~ersity campus. 5 
.No other frotestant missionaries were wounded, but mahy had narrow 
escapes. Dr. Edwin Mari of the Disciples of Christ heard about Dr. 
Williams' death after breakfast and hid his wife at a Girls Middle 
School shortly before soldiers broke into his house. · The soldiers de-
manded money, and an accompanying mob looted ever:ything of value, even 
6 taking the window frames. 
After he had satisfied the first group, Dr. Marx faced other bands 
of raiding soldiers who demanded money; their slogan being, "Your money 
or your life!" A few were friendly and joked with Dr. Marx, but most 
were menacing. None offered an adequate reason for the attack, allud-
ing only to vague propaganda slogans. 
The soldiers became more belligerent after Pr. Marx ran out of 
money, but before harm befell Marx, two Chinese friends intervened and 
ransomed him. They arrived none too soon as Marx was about to be exe-
7 
cuted. The friendly Chinese took Dr. Marx to the Girls Middle School 
where his wife and four missionaries were hidden in a fuel house behind 
several cords of wood. 
From there they heard foreign gunboats in Nan.king anchorage begin 
the shelling of the city about 3:30. p.m. 0ne shell exploded very near 
the Girls School; but the main target was Socony Hill, some distance 
north of the school. The bombardment la.sted about an hour, and when it 
5 R. M. Chester and L. Thurston, Gin.ling.College (New York~ United 
Board for Christian Colleges in China, 1955), 61. 
6 
. War ld fill~. XXIV (May, 19 27) , 26. 
7 Ibid., 27. 
i 
17 
ended, the Marx party heard bugles, and the rioting immediately ceasedo 
Chinese friends soon came and gave Marx and the others Chinese 
garments for disguise and escorted them to Bailie Hall where the Protes-
tant missionaries had gathered for safetyo Burning buildings, fired by 
Nationalist troops, lit the sky as the Marx party made its way to safety 
b . h 8 y nig L 
Other missionaires had harrowing experienceso Soldiers captured 
Dro Frank Price {Methodist), Professor of Theology at Nanking Univer-
sity, at his home and demanded moneyo He willingly gave them money from 
his safe, but he did not satisfy them sufficiently to ward off their 
looting the house, breaking up furniture, and stealing his hat and over-
coat from his persono They threatened Price repeatedly and struck him 
with rifle butts and the flats of their swords, Three times they de-
manded that Price kneel down to be executed, but each time he refused, 
and the soldiers did not press the matter, Finally. the soldiers decided 
to kill Price, and they began to drag him towards a nearby seminary, 9 
Chinese servants grappled with the soldiers to save him, and sev-
eral were wounded, In the end, the soldiers agreed to release Price, 
but they obtained the privilege of looting the servants' homes in ex-
change for his life. lO 
A distinct pattern is evident in the behavior of the Nationalist 
troops in all of these incidents. First, a band of soldiers arrived at 
a foreign home, demanding money and threatening lives, These· soldiers 
8Ibid, The other four missionaries included Mrs, Edna Gish, .Miss 
Emma A, Lyon,.Mr, C, H, Plopper, and Mr, E, Co Whipple, 
9Hale Collection, VII, 2, 
lONorth.China Herald, (April 2, 1927), 290 
18 
were dressed in Kuomintang uniforms and spoke in Southern Chinese dia-
lects, primarily Hunanese and Cantonese. 
Accompanying the soldiers were civilians, described as "rabble" or 
"riff-raff", who looted the foreign property. Dr. Marx felt that the 
rabble consisted of camp followers and the lower elements of Nanking's 
population, 11 and Dr. Williams' wife described them as peasants from 
Nanking's outskirts. on the verge of starvation because of famine.in the 
12 previous winter. ·Whatever their origin they thoroughly stripped the 
missionary houses. 
The danger to the missionary lives appeared to increase when their 
money ran out, but at this point Chinese friends usually intervened and 
saved.the missionaries' lives. The Chinese then took the ransomed mis-
sionaries to a hiding place or to Bailie Hall on the Nanking University 
campus. 
A number of missionaries found hiding places and escaped contact 
with the Nationalists until after the barrage. Some hid in Chinese 
huts, in attics, in cellars, and two men spent nine hours concealed in 
. 13 
a cistern. 
The naval barrage halted Nationalist terrorist activities, and 
when it ended, mis.sionaries heard bugles, and Nationalist officers ac-
tively.intervened to stop fur~her destruction. Because of this sudden 
reversal of Nationalist actions and policy, and because some civilians, 
probably party cadres, aided the troops in finding foreigners, 
11 World Call, (May, 1927), 27. 
12wheeler, Williams, 176. 
13 World Call, (May, 1927), 27. 
19 
missionary opinion usually concluded that the attack was preconceived, 
By noon, March 25, all miss;ionaries had arrived at Bailie Hall--· 
over 120 men, women, and children gathered there. After the barrage 
Kuomintang officials had stationed a guard around Bailie Hall, and Chi-
nese friends comforted the refugees, bringing food and bedding. On the 
afternoon of Friday, March 25, the Red Swastika Society, a Buddhist 
relief organization, provided carriages and a guard and took the mis-
14 
sionaries to the waiting gunboats. 
Damage to mission property was extensive. The Nationalists burned 
nine foreign buildings and four Chinese Christian houses, 15 and only 
Ginling College escaped damage. The college 1 s good fortune came about 
through some unusual circumstances, A Hunanese officer had a sister 
there, and he came early Thursday morning and forced a group of would-
be looters to form a guard around the college, The officer then escort-
ed fourteen foreign teachers and two missionaries, who had sought shel-
h 11 ·1· 11 16 ter at t e co ege, to Bai 1e Ha . This is the only instance of a 
Kuomintang officer intervening to protect foreign lives and property 
17 before the barrage. 
The events at Nanking were tragic, but there were some elements of 
humor. A doctor at the university covered himself with a blood-red 
14 Wheeler, Willia.ms, 179-182. 
15washington Post, (March 28, 1927). The buildings included the 
Hillcrest School, the old dormitory of the Bible Women 1 s Training 
. School, and the residences of the Reverend L. H. Lancaster, the Reverend 
W. F. Dieterick, the Reverend W. F. Wilson, Dr. A. C. Hutcheson, Mrs. 
M. P. Keen, and Mr. S. J. Mills. 
16Hale Collection, III, 2. 
17 Chester and Thurston, Ginling, 59-60. 
mixture and pretended to be mad. The Chinese ,~re ·sup·e·rstitious shout 
the insane, and the looters were frightened away. 18 In ·another inci-
dent, the Reverend C. S. Smith, ·a Presbyterian·'missionary, offered to 
20 
write a check to meet the demands of a group of soldiers. · While he wa:s 
filling,out the draft 9 the nervous soldiers grabbed the blank checks 
db f . h. h . 19 an egan 1.g ting overt em. 
· Ferhaps the most amusing event took place at the home of Dr. W. E. 
Macklin~ a Disciples of Christ missionary. As Nationalist soldiers 
finished ransacking the house, they noticed several large white boxes 
in the backyard. Thinking the boxes of value, they rushed out and 
opened them. .Instantly, swarms of bees attacked the soldiers. The 
,white :boxes were beehives! 20 
Roman Catholic Missions 
American attention centered on the attacks against.Protestants, 
hut the xenophobia of March 24. knew no favorites. Catholics of Euro-
pean extraction also suffered from the Kuomintang attacks. The Roman 
Catholic community in Nanking was small, consisting of several hundred 
Chinese converts. The center of the congregation was Ricci College, a 
small secondary school operated:: by the Society of Jesus and staffed by 
four priests. 21 
On the day of terror soldiers arrived at the school after morning 
mass and created a disturbance in the school courtyard. 
--
1
~World .f.~lL (May 1927), 28. 
19Hale Collection~ V, 4-5. 
20North China Herald 9 (April 2, 1927), 9. 
21· -M. Searle Bates to author, February 16, 1927. 
Breakfasting 
priests received word of this through a Chinese servant .. When Father 
Henry DuGont, a Frenchman, and Father P. Vanara, an Italian, went to 
22 investigate, both were shot as they stepped from the school door. 
21 
The Nationalists murdered the priests without provocation, and an offi-
cer appears to have fired the pistol that felled one of the priests. 23 
The other two priests, Father J, Verdier and Father Bureau, escaped to 
24 
a French gunboat, the Alerte, 
Japanese Consulate 
Meantime, the Nationalists fanned out to attack the foreign consu-
lates, The first skirmish of the day, in fact, took place at the Japa-
nese consulate, located near Nanking University, where thirty soldiers 
arrived at 7:15 a,m, No damage resulted from this. initial confrontation, 
but shortly thereafter, another group stormed the consulate, led by 
armed women shouting, "Down with imperialism!" They sacked the Japanese 
property and left only the picture of Emperor Hirohito and a cipher code 
b k . 25 oo 1.ntact. 
Soldiers wounded the Japanese consul, Major N:emoto, as he lay sick 
in bed, 26 Nemoto's wife saved his life by shielding him with her body, 
There were several other Japanese casualties. The Chinese troops bayo-
netted the Japanese chief-of-police,.Mori, and shot two Japanese 
22North China Herald, (April 2, 1927), 9. 
23ForeignRelations, 2:2.~_Z,,, 153. 
24LondonTimes, (May 28, 1927), 16, 
25North China Herald, (April 2, 1927), 1. 
26Ibid,, 14, 
marines. 27 Further, the Nationalists directed fire at a Japanese de-
stroyer, and killed a stoker aboard this vessei. 28 
Despite these insults, the Japanese avoided a confrontation with 
the Chinese. in order to safeguard the lives of the Japanese merchants 
22 
in Nanking. The Japanese consul even ordered the removal of a sandbag 
defense circling the consulate so that Chinese looters could remove 
their booty more easily. 
This order so affronted Lieutenant K. Araki, the officer in charge 
of the duty, that he committed suicide four days later. His suicide 
note demonstrated the Japanese dilemma: 
In order to ensure the safety of the Japanese residents I 
endured what we could not tolerate, The lives of the Japa-
nese refugees could be saved, but I am ashamed that the 
honor of the Japanese Navy was disgraced by the Southern 
soldiers,29 
The attack on the Japanese consulate did not end until one of the 
Southern soldiers--a Nationalist Army Political Bureau chief--stopped 
the looting and stationed a guard at the consulate. He told the Japan-
ese that the Nanking.branch of the Chinese Communist Party instigated 
the incident in protest against an alleged rapproachment between Chiang 
Kai-shek, the moderate Kuomintang commander, and Japan. The Communists 
wished to embarrass Chiang with the foreign powers to strengthen the 
K . 1 f . 30 uomLntang et wing. 
27 Ibid,, 5. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 14. 
3°Foreign Relations, 1927, 165. 
23 
British Consulate 
The missionary establishments and the Japanese consulate.were lo-
cated near one another in the southern part of Nanking, and the Kuomin-
tang soldiers and looters reached these buildings early in the morning, 
The British and American consulates and the foreign business establish-
men ts were in. a section of the city further north, and they were not 
attacked until mid-morning, 
The Kuomintang. stormed the British diplomatic compound and looted 
the consultate house at about 9:30. They. surprised Consul Bertram Giles, 
his wife, and four British subjects in the consulate office, a separate 
b 'ld' 31 Ul. 1.ng. When Giles and Captain Spear of the Indian Army went to 
i.nvestigate, two soldiers stopped them and attacked, crying, "Tah! 
Tah 1, 11 (K'll 1 1. . • Kill!) They wounded Giles and Spear and then turned 
their fire on Dr. L, Satchwell Smith who had run out of the consulate 
house to avoid looters, Smith 1 s murder temporarily distracted the sol-
diers, and Giles and Spear retreated to the consulate office, 32 
The consulate party then hid in the office strong room where the 
pursuing soldiers did not find them, More soldiers soon followed, 
bringing two hostages, a marine and an employee of a British firm, Both 
had been captured at the consulate house. Mrs. T, Roberts, one of the 
women in the strong room, saw the two men through a crack and cried out, 
''Marines'.i ", thinking they were a rescue party, The soldiers, alerted 
to the party's hiding place, forced them from the strong room and robbed 
31British Nanking Papers, 3. The party included Mr. J, L. Bowker 
of the Asiatic Petroleum Co., Miss Ethel Blake, Mrs. T, Roberts, and 
Capt. Spear of the Indian Army, 
32Ibid., 8. 
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them. The soldiers brutally handled the women and ripped their clothes. 
When .the soldiers finally left, two local Chinese police arrived to 
assist the British. 33 
· As the po lice appeared, a commo.tion erupted outside the office. It 
was the harbormaster,. Mr.· F. Huber, fighting two soldiers. Among the 
British citizens residing in Nanking,. Huber was the only one who put 
attention to duty ahead of self-protection and stayed at his job. When 
he finally tried to reach the safety of the consulate, .the two soldiers 
accosted him, and in the ensuing struggle, shot him in the head. There 
he died, before the very eyes of the helpless consulate party. 34 
:After this incident, the police took the British to the consulate 
gatehouse, but this new hiding place was soon discovered as the looting 
and attacks continued. From the gatehouse the British could see local 
Chinese walking freely. on the street. As foreigners who were the ob-
ject of Nationalist wrath, the British might well have envied the un-
concern of the Chinese, particularly, when passing Kuomintang officers 
ignored their pleas for help. 35 
Finally, about noon,. the isolated British received reinforcements 
as five British marines joined them after failing to reach the gunboats. 
These marines were weaponless, a remnant of the detachment assigned to 
the consulate on the previous day and now dispersed through the city. 
Some had escaped to the gunboats, and some.had hidden at the Standard 
Oil House on· Socony Hill. 
33Ibid. 
34Ibid., 4-5. 
35 rbid., 4, 6, and 9. 
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These weaponless reinforcements did not deter further attacks and 
the Nationalists became more aggressive in the afternoon. Once a sol-
dier attempted to execute Giles with a broadsword, but stopped. short, 
frightened away by.the gunboat barrage. Thereafter, Chinese friends 
. brought food, and tr~ated Giles' and Spear's wounds. The next after-
noon the Red Swastika Society, a Buddhist charitable body, transported 
the British.party clown to the bund where a motor launch carried them to 
36 the HMS Emerald. 
United States Consulate 
.Meantime, the United States.consulate received. its detachment of 
unwelcome guests. Consul John K. Davis reported seeing Kuomintang 
troops in the vicinity of the American consulate at 8:00 a.m. rounding 
up Northern soldiers, They paid little.heed to the Americans, but later 
a Kuomintang petty officer,. ''his face- twisted with violent hate", ac-
costed the American consul, saying, "'.You are all alike. The British 
and Italians are killing our men in Shanghai, and you Americans have 
drunk our blood for years and have become rich, We are-busy now killing 
Fengtien (Northern) soldiers, but we will soon begin killing all for-
eigners inNanking:i regardless of what country they arefrom. 1137 These 
remarks surprised Davis since he did not expect trouble from the Nation-
alists, but shortly thereafter, confirming that this was not idle brag-
gadocio, he received news of Dr. Williams' death and the attacks on 
missionaries. Moreover, a number of Seventh Day Adventists sought 
36Ibid., 10-11. 
37F · R 1 ' 1927 153 ore1.gn _ e at1.ons, _, . 
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shelter in the consulate after being robbed. 38 
.Local police urged Davis to seek refuge after hearing about the 
assault on the British. Davis called the. Standard Oil House on Socony 
Hill and talked.with Earle T. Hobart, the Standard Oil Manager, who 
suggested that the Americans move to Socony Hill since it was a natural-
39 ly defensible area, near the city, wall, and in touch with the gunboats. 
Davis concurred.with Hobart's idea, and the American party of twenty-
40 four left the consulate at 11:00 a.m. After the first 100 yards they 
were under constant fire even though the party clearly identified itself 
by carrying an American flag. Davis estimated that over 300 shots were 
41 fired at the group, but the Nationalists were amazingly poor shots, 
42 
and only a marine named Plumely was wounded. 
The Americans reached So cony Hill at 11: 30, and Davis. immediately 
. called. the Chinese staff at the consulate. He learned that soldiers 
had entered. the consulate five minutes after he left, and that they had 
looted. the building, chasing away most of the Chinese office staff with 
h d f . 43 treats an gun ire. 
· 
38Ibid., 154, 
39Alice T. Hobart, "What Happened at·Nanking," Harperus Monthly 
MagazineP CXL, (July, 1927), 143. 
40 
. The American Consulate party included seven missionaries, an 
officer and eleven marines, Consul and Mrs. Davis, their two children, 
and Mr. J. F. McDonald of Liggett and Myer Company. 
41F ' R 1 '. oreign e ations, 
42North China.Herald, 
1927, 155. 
(April 2, 1927), 3. 
43Foreign Relations, 1211., 156 .. The call.was made to S, S. Li, 
head of the consulate office staff. 
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Socony Hill 
The arrival of the Americans brought the.total number of refugees 
S d d Ofl H f"f 44 at tan ar ~ ouse to L ty-one. These refugees were mostly mer-
chants, who had flocked there at the first. sign of trouble. News of the 
raid on the British consulate caused panic among the early arrivals at 
Socony Hill, and they tried to reach the gunboats by going over the wall. 
Nationalist soldiers foiled this attempt and confiscated the only rope 
the group had, 
The first group of Nationalists had arrived around noon, They were 
Hunanese, and Hobart befriended them easily since he had lived in Hunan 
several years, 45 After receiving rice and tea, they left, but soldiers 
began to arrive at regular intervals thereafter. They were menacing, 
but were also bought off with a little money. Around 2:00 p.m., six 
soldiers, more aggressive and demanding then previous visitors, came to 
Socony. They tried to enter the house, but Hobart and Davis barred 
their way and bargained with the soldiers to leave. 46 
Safety seemed assured when American Vice-Consul Hall Paxton arrived 
from Hsiakwan, Nanking's port city, where he had been trapped. the night 
44 rbid,, 155. Those at the Standard Oil House included Mr, and Mrs. 
E. T. Hobart,. W.R. Sims, and E, M. Green of Standard Oil Company; L. T. 
Barnard, F. Boulton, and F. C, Jordan of the British-American Tobacco 
Company; N, M. Draper, Texas Company; Mr. Ware, Liggett and Myer; eight 
marines; Captain Heathcoate. and Lt. Oliver Bellais, British Army; a 
Russian chauffeur from the British Consulate; Y. T. Vylegmanin and W. E. 
McKenney, Customs; A. Tangarass and Reverend Aarflot, Norwegian,.Mission; 
and three British citizens, M.r, George Jack,,Mr. F. F. Laughland, and 
Mr. Bowker. 
45Alice T. Hobart, "What Happened at Nanking," Harper's.Monthly 
Magazine, CXL, (July, 1927), 144-147, 
46 Hobart, Nanking, 194-205, 
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before. He came with several civilians, described as members of a local 
self-styled Kuomintang political club. They brought written orders from 
a Nationalist com.mander for the safety of the Socony party. At first 
the soldiers listened to the cadres, but they soon grew hostile, robbed 
the cadres, and drove them off. 
· The soldiers then forced their way into the house, but the marines 
inside had positioned themselves around the door, and the Nation.alists 
found the guns of the marines squarely trained on them. They turned 
. and fled, and on reaching cover, began firing at the Standard Oil House. 
The marines returned fire,. at first aiming over the Nationalists' head.s, 
but then shooting to kill. 47 
Other Nationalist soldiers soon joined the fusillade, and a full-
scale battle developed, The situation became critical for the foreign 
party as the Kuomintang prepared to rush the house. Two signalmen,. who 
had been stationed at Socony, flashed a signal to the.HMS Emerald and 
the USS Noa, asking for a barrage, but .Davis rescinded this request in 
a moment of indecision. The hopelessness of the situation soon prompted 
Davis to reconsider, and within a few minutes the first shells burst 
around the. house, The signalmen semaphor,ed one more signal, "We are 
leaving; shoot a little more to the left", and the party scrambled out 
f h h h ' 11 48 o t e ouse tote city wa • 
Before the arrival of soldiers, the foreigners had constructed 
three ropes of clothing and. sheets. They threw the ropes over the wall 
and descended, One improvised rope bro.ke, and Hobart fell and fractured 
47Foreign Relations, 1927, 157-159. 
48washington.Post, (March 28, 1927), 4. 
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his ankle, He was the only casualty during the two hour flight to the 
gunboats, 
Aboard the Gunboats 
The gunboats received the first request for a barrage at 3:22 p,m,, 
with a second signal following at 3:37 p,m, The HMS Emerald responded 
with two director shells, and seventy-six explosive shells followed in 
a seventy minute period, The American gunboats, the USS Noa and USS 
W,. B, Preston, joined in the bombardment, All gun crew fired with a 
high degree of accuracy, dropping but a •ingle shell outside the target 
49 
area. 
The Emerald and the two American vessels then sent marines to the 
city wall to escort the Socony party, The marines arrived too late to 
help the party, but they did rescue two British postal employees trapped 
at the Yangtze Hotel in Hsiakwan, 50 
Throughout the day the gunboats had ser~ed as the foreign force in 
reserve. As early as 7 :30 a,m, on the fateful day of March 24 1 the 
first Nationalist troops had reached the waterfront and made contact 
51 
with the foreign fleet, By 9:00 a,m, they began to fire at the shore 
positions staked out by two platoons of British marines in the Inter-
national Export compound; and at 1:15 the Nationalists observed with 
satisfaction the flight of the shore-based troops to the gunboats. 
Meantime,. intermittent, random firing. forced the British off two mer-
chant hulks which served as wharves and brought death to Able Seaman 
49B' ' h N k' P ritis . an ing apers, 
50washington. Post 1 (March 28 1 1927) 1 4. 
51British Nanking Papers, 15. 
52 John Knox, aboard the Emerald. 
_Captain H.- T. England of the· Emerald could not disregard the 
30 
-Nationalist rifle fire,. but it was more of a nuisance than a threat to 
hiis force afloat. Primarily, hewas concerned about the safety of the 
150 foreigners not accounted for inside Nanking. Through the early 
morning he had kept in touch with the city_ by radio from the British 
consulate, but his two signalmen fled the consulate at 10:14 a.m. with 
a final ominous message: 53 "House looted." -Thereafter, he relied on 
. the two signalmen who semaphored messages from Socony Hill, but they 
fled in the mid-afternoon, and England's communications :with the city 
1 54 l were comp etely severed. As he conferred with Consu Davis, just 
arrived aboard ship, about the problem of the unprotected foreign com-
munity, an opening appeared. At this juncture a delegation from the 
Red. Swastika Society boarded the Emerald __ to express regrets over the 
day's incident at the behest of Sixth Nationalist Army commander, Gen-
eral Ch' eng Ch'.ien, who had just arrived at Nanking. 
The American and British officials took this opportunity, to make 
.certain demands on the Kuomintang commander. They required the protec-
tion and evacuation of foreigners, the protection of foreign property, 
and the appearance of the Fourth Division commander to make arrangements 
for these demands, If the Chinese failed to comply with these demands, 
the naval captains threatened further military action, 
General Ch'eng sent a written statement of regrets about the 
52rbid., Jardine=Matheson and Butterfield-Swire owned the two- hulks. 
53rbid., 16-17. 
54washington Post, (March 28, 1927), 4. 
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incident that evening, but he did not answer the British and American 
demands until late the next morning on March 25. He then refused to 
enter into local negotiations and evasively referred any discussion to 
normal diplomatic channels. 
The Kuomintang reply was not satisfactory, and when two staff of-
ficers arrived in the afternoon toarrange an evacuation, the American 
and British officials issued a near ultimatum, demanding that all for-
eigners be evacuated by 6:00 p.m., or the Kuomintang would "have to 
take the consequences." ·What the consequences were, was not made clear, 
55 but they vividly reminded the Chinese of the recent bombardment. 
Shortly before the deadline, the British .consulate party came out 
of the city, followed by the missionaries from.Nanking University. The 
Japanese filed out last, and when the city gates closed for the night of 
March 25, 1927, not one international representative remained in Nan-
king. 
The Nanking refugees sailed down to the China coast and the secur-. 
ity of Shanghai. They hardly enjoyed their cruise. Sixty-five of their 
number were victims of ptomaine poisoning from the food of the USS Noa. 
All underwent Nationalist shelling of t;:he gunboats at several points 
along the river. At Chinkiang the firing was especially heavy, and a 
56 
shell pierced the fire control station of the USS Preston. 
Members of the escaping foreign community, left six dead comrades 
behind at Nanking, and Consul Giles, Captain Spear, Anna Moffett, three 
Japanese, and an American marine. had been wounded, The property loss 
55 0 
. Fore1.gn Relations, .!21L 160-161. 
· 
5
,
6washington Post, (March 28, 1927), 14. 
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from burning and looting was substantial. No accurate estimate is pos-
sible, but the size of the loss might be indicated by the cost to the 
International Export Company which lost more than ..(120,000 in commer-
cial goods to looters. 57 
The refugees were acutely aware of the cost of the anti-foreign 
riots at Nanking in lives and property. They were certain that the 
"fiends" who had perpetrated the "planned" attacks were Nationalists. 
In short, they knew what had happened at Nanking, and who had attacked 
them, but they did not know who ordered the attack, nor did they under-
stand clearly the purpose of the violence, Why then, had the foreign 
community been attacked? 
57 London Times, (April 1, 1927), 14. 
CHAPTER. I II 
NORTHERNERS, NATIONALISTS, OR COMMUNISTS? 
The Nationalist News Agency,. Kuomin, at Hankow had a ready explana-
.tion for the anti-foreign riots at Nanking, It blamed Northern.troops. 
A news dispatch, released. on,March 20, 1927, read: 
· The military authori,ties at Nanki:ng report that the disorders 
on. March 24 were caused by remnants .. of the defeated. Northern-
ers and White Russian.mercenaries in Marshal Chan Chung-
chang' s army who instigated .the attacks on foreign consulates 
in order to involve the Nationalist forces with the Powers.1 
Doubtless. this was part of Hankow' s war of nerves. with Chiang Kai-
shek who established a rival government at.Nanking three weeks later. 
Hankow, hoping to dodge the charge of responsibility for the Nanking 
: Incident from Chiang, singled out .the Northern. troops as a convenient 
2 
. scapegoat. 
Only. one writer, G. A. Kennedy of the Shanghai American· School, 
has given any credence to Hankow' s a.ssertion of Northern responsibility. 
After visiting Nanking.in early April, 1927, he concluded that the 
·Nationalists were not responsible since they had not attacked foreign-
ers. in other cities. He pointed out that in a.planned attack there 
would have been more casualties. TheNationalists captured over.27,000 
prisoners-of-war at Nanking, and.according to Kennedy, many were 
1North China Herald, (April 9,. 1927), 50. 
· 
2Hollington K. Tong, Chiang I<ai- shek (London,. Hurst and Blackett, 
1938), Volume I, 133. 
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present during the riots and capable of looting. Gear left by looters 
belonged to Northern troops, so he concluded that the rioters were war-
3 lord troops, 
Kennedy later reversed his position, and.in an interview with the 
China Weekly Review, he stated that before writing his article, he had 
not talked with the Nanking refugees. Since then, he had heard the full 
story and believed that Nationalist troops committed the "outrages. 114 
. The new. Nanking government did not offi.cially identify the anti-
foreign rioters, but Chiang Kai-shek accepted full responsibility for 
the event. He promised to investigate the incident and punish any 
Nationalist soldiers involved. 
Nanking avoided official comment for political reasons. · Hankow' s 
policy, based on anti-foreignism, was popular with the masses, and re-
pudiation of this principle was not politically expec;lient. Unofficially, 
Nanking indicated that Communists had incited the riots. 5 
In his memoirs Chiang Kai-shek recalls that the riot at Nanking 
was a "Communist engineered incident", designed to "provoke a direct 
6 
clash between the foreign powers and our Revolutionary Army." Chiang's 
official biographer,. Hollington K. Tong, states that the head of the 
.Sixth Army. Political Department, a leftist named Lin Tsu-han, "took his 
orders from Bo.rodin (Comintern agent and Soviet Advisor to the Kuomin-
tang) and the Communists at Hankow." Lin organized the incident with 
3ChinaWeeklyReview, (May 14, 1927), 290. 
4Ibid. 
5Chinese Recorder, XLII, (August, 1927), 550. 
6Chiang. Kai- shek, Soviet Russia in China (New York, Farrar, Stra1-1s, 
and Cudahy, 1957), 49. 
35 
the help of a sympathetic brigade commander who carried out the "terror-
. i . . 117 1.st act v1.t1.es. 
The Communist purpose, states Tong, was to discredit Chiang Kai-
shek with foreigners and to prevent his successful entry into Nanking, 
"the probable Capital of New China.'·' Chiang, enroute from Kiukiang to 
join his armies, heard of the plot and sailed on to Shanghai. 8 
. Nanking's missionary refugees also concluded. that the rioters were 
Communists. The Reverend Stanley· Smith (Methodist) referred to the 
"insidious influence of Ri,issian Communism" at work at Nanking. 9 Another 
ro.issionary called the event "Communist and Russian.inspired." 
Nanking's missionary refugees described their attackers as "a group 
with Communist beliefs, impatient with Chiang Kai-shek for not leaning 
left, and who sought to <;l.iscredit him." Dr. M. S, Bates, a Disciples 
·Missionary, records that Lin;Tsu-han.ordered the attack to embroil Chiang 
' hf' i b lO w1.t ore gn gun~oats. Bates had first felt that "there was no organ~ 
ized program to kill, or not one (foreigner) could have escaped. 1111 
According to one missionary, more foreigners were not killed because the 
"detachment of hard-core Communist troops," who spread the order to kill 
all foreigners, met with indifferent success among Nationalist troops. 12 
The Communists resorted to propaganda to avoid responsibility for 
7Tong, Chiang, 134, 
8Ibid., 135. 
9Hale Collection, V, 12. 
10 M. Searle Bates to author, February 16, 1968. 
11M. Searle Bates, "The Ordeal of Nanking, II World. Call, (May, 1927), 
special supplement, 2. 
12 M. Searle Bates to author, February 16, 1968. 
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the riots, Through the Soviet news agency, Tass, and the Hankow govern-
ment, they circulated a story that over 2000 Chinese were massacred in 
the gunboat barrage at Nanking, This subterfuge was printed throughout 
South China and parts of North China, creating widespread anti-
13 foreignism, reminiscent of Boxer Rebellion days, 
· The Communist death claim was an exaggeration, The official death 
count, released inconspicuously much later, was three Chinese dead, and 
Searle Bates reports that "one of my alert and mobile Chinese friends 
14 had inquired widely and had been able to hear of only one (death)," 
Another account, issued by Chiang Kai 00 shek, disclosed that six Chinese 
15 
soldiers were killed and a dozen wounded. These lower figures seem 
more reasonable since the bombarded area was uninhabited, except for a 
few scattered foreign homes, 
Only one Communist writer,.M. N, Roy, discusses the Nan.king Inci-
dent without referring to this propaganda claim, Roy, an Indian and 
Comintern agent to China in 1927, mentioned that General Ch' eng Ch I ien, 
the Nationalist commander at Nanking, was loyal to the Hankow govern-
ment, but he showed little sympathy with the foreign community. "In 
view of the standing provocation through the presence of foreign mili-
tary and naval units.in the heart of China," he declared, "it is a 
matter of surprise that in the course of revolutionary war, many more 
16 lives and property of foreigners were not destroyed." 
13North China Herald, (April 9, 1927), 50, 
14 · 
· M, Searle Bates to author, February 16 1 1968, 
15washington Post, (April 1, 1927), 1. 
16M. N. Roy, Revolution and Counter-revolution in China {Calcutta, 
Renaissance Publishers, 1946~501-506. - . 
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The evi.dence indicates a Communist plot at Nanking, but such an 
hypothesis overlooks the complicated Chinese political puzzle, The 
Kuomintang-Communist alliance, formed in 1923, was about to split be-
cause of internal dissension in both parties, This compact brought 
Soviet techrrtcal, political, and military aid to the Kuomintang govern-
ment at Canton and broadened the political appeal of the Cormnunists, 
Thus, the alliance was meant to strengthen both parties, but instead it 
created internal divisions within the Cormnunist and Nationalist Par-
i 17 t es, These frictions created the Nanking Incident. 
According to Borodin, the issue of Communist entry into the Kuomin-
tang divided the Chinese Communists seriously when the Third Party Con-
gress met. in 1923, Even Ch I en Tu-hsiu,. Communist Party. Chairman, 
opposed the decision, but Maring, a Comintern agent, indicated that the 
Soviet government supported the alliance, and invoked Comintern. disci-
18 pline over his opponents, 
After the Communists had joined the Kuomintang, however reluctantly, 
an opposition force--a right wing--·developed within the Kuomintang in 
opposition. to their presence, Hu Han-min led the right wing which, 
after Sun Yat-sen 1 s death in 1925, coalesced into the "Sun Yat~senist 
Society, 1119 Hu fell from power in 1925 when he was implicated in the 
slaying of Liao Chung-kai, a prominent member of the leftKuomintang, 
Thereafter, the right wing was in eclipse, and Wang Ch'ing-wei and 
17H. R, Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1951), 62, 
18c. M, Wilbur and J, L. How, Documents of Communism, Nationalism, 
and Soviet, Advisors to China (New York, Columbia University Press, 1956), 
511. 
19 Isaacs, Tragedy, 76. 
38 
Chiang Kai-shek guided the.Kuomintang, 20 
Wang favored the left, and Chiang, known as the ''Red General" in 
treaty-port press, represented the party army, Since Chiang had studied 
military organization under the direction of Leon Trotsky in Moscow and 
had established WhampoaMilitary Academy and the Kuomintang Army after 
the Soviet model he had seen in Soviet Russia, it appeared that the left 
11 d h K . 21 contro e t e uomintang, 
This was not the case, On March 20, 1926, Chiang instigated a coup 
ousting Wang Ch' ing~wei,, He removed all Communists from the Canton gov-
ernment, disarmed Communist pickets, confined the Soviet advisors.to 
quarters, and arrested political commissars assigned to the army, most 
of them Communists, 
Chiang knew he still needed Soviet aid and support so he minimized 
the coup's implications, He reinstated the Russian advisors and curbed 
the power of the Kuomintang right wing, These concessions he made under 
pressure from Borodin, but Chiang received a counter-commitment from 
the Russian that Communist activities within the Kuomintang would be 
circumscribed, Chiang thus eliminated opposition within the party and 
1 d h . lf d h '1' ' f. · 1 22 pace imse an t e mi itary in 1rm contro , In effect the Kuomin-
tang became a militarily-controlled movement, much like its opponent, 
the warlord government in North China, 
One week before Chiang Kai-shek's coup, the Executive Committee of 
the Communist International (ECCI) had reaffirmed the policy of a single 
20 Isaacs, Tragedy, 76, 
21 Conrad Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1958), 71, 
22 Isaacs, Tragedy, 89-110, 
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national revolutionary front of workers, peasants, and bourgeoisie in 
China; in short, the continuation of the Kuomintang-Communist entente, 23 
In light of the altered political situation within tbe Kuomintang, the 
Comintern should have reasse$sed its policy, but it could not, Stalin, 
whose hand guided Comintern policy, was locked in a power struggle with 
Trotsky, who challenged Comintern policy, in China, Trotsky pointed out 
that the Kuomintang-Communist alliance_was fiction, The Communists were 
subordinate to the Kuomintang.and lacked the independence to operate 
successfully. In essence, Trotsky believed, "the Chinese proletariat 
. was prohibited by policies of the leadership of the Communist Inter-
national from ful;Eilling the role imposed upon it by history, 1124 Those 
leaders were Stalin and Bukharin, Trotsky's arch-enemies, 
Stalin and his allies could not admit that the Kuomintang had be-
come a "reactionary" party, so the Comintern adopted a conciliatory 
attitude concerning the coup and encouraged the strengthening of the 
left Kuomintang, hoping eventually to overturn Chiang Kai-shek or, at 
best, to wean him from the right, The Soviet advisors continued to co-
operate with Chiang on the theory that he should be used, even if he 
was d ' . h b h' . . . , 25 ece1v1ng t em a out is intentions, · 
Instead, Chiang used the Communists, By the time Stalin's faction 
gained full control of the Soviet Communist Party and ousted Trotsky in 
23 Wilbur and How, Documents, 225. 
24 Leon Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese Revolution (New York, 
Pioneer Publishers, 1932), 10.- -
25 Wilbur and How, Documents, 225, 
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December, 1927, any change.in Chinese policy was too late. 26 Chiang 
had already dissolved the Kuomintang-Communist alliance and ejected the 
Soviet advisors after squeezing them of full value. 
Chiang's intentions were transparent to the Chinese Communists, and 
at the Second Enlarged Plenum of the Chinese Communist Central Committee 
in July, 1926, two deviationists elements attacked Comintern policy. 
One faction, led by Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, demanded. immediate withdrawal from 
the Kuomintang, stating that support of the left Kuomintang was impos-
sible since Chiang's coup had eliminated the left. One Soviet advisor, 
Nilov of the Nationalist Fourth Army, supported this view. To him the 
27 left had neither masses nor leaders. 
The other deviationist element wanted to seize the Kuomintang 
. leadership, fill the party with the masses, and create a truly revolu-
tionary party. · Certain members of the Communist Kwangtung Regional 
Cammi ttee supported this policy. 28 
The Central Committee declared both deviations erroneous, but this 
dL.d . d" 29 not quLet iscontent. In December, 1926, at a Special Conference 
of the Central Committee held at Hankow, the Kwangtung Regional Commit-
tee again asserted. the need for direct struggle with Chiang Kai-shek's 
faction for control of the Kuomintang. T'ang Ping-shan, Chinese Com-
munist delegate to the 7th Plenum of the ECCI which also met in December 
1926, also attacked Comintern policy, T'ang foresaw Chiang's design to 
26F. L. Schuman, Russia Since 1917 (New York,, A. A. Knopt, 1957), 
137-143. 
27wilbur and How, Documents, 225. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 254-255, 
establish a military dictatorship and stated that to continue to pro-
mote Chiang Kai-shek, was to sacrifice the interests of the left--the 
30 peasants and workers, 
Nevertheless, the Comintern. continued to encourage an alliance 
. with the left Kuomintang, and when the Nationalist government moved 
from Can.ton to Hankow in December, 1926, the left seemed to gain the 
upper hand as Chiang Kai-shek remained aloof in a rival camp at Nan-
41 
chang. Chiang did not break with Hankow and espoused party unity, and 
the Comintern believed that the new Hankow government was truly revo-
lutionary, 
This was wishful thinking on the Comintern's part. According to 
M, N. Roy, Hankow was a duplicate of Nanchang, do~inated by the reac-
tionary forces of left militarism, the petit bourgeois, and exploiting 
31 
classes, The party commissioners, who established the government, 
had been chosen for their right wing bias, but on reaching Hankow.they 
took advantage of the political climate to gain personal power, 32 These 
were the.nreactionary" leaders such as Ho Chien, Sun. Fo, and Tang Yen-
kai. Hank0w 1 s military strong-man was T 1 ang. Sheng-,chin, whose personal 
rivalry with Chiang Kai-shek soon accelerated the Kuomintang split, 33 
Hankow 1 s policies were not "revolutionary," The government did 
not enforce directives calling for wage increases and land reforms, and 
the working classes were heavily, taxed, When workers' unions and 
3oTrotsky 1 Problems, 31. 
31Roy 1 Revolution, 423-424, 
32Ibid, 1 426, 
33rbid, , 430, 
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peasant organizations began to stir discontent, Hankow suppressed them, 
and on May 21, 1927 ~ the Changsha garrison in Hunan' s capital eliminated 
h 1 . . . r h . 34 t e pro etarLat organ1zatLons or tat city. The scene at Changsha was 
reminescent of the "blood-bath" conducted a month earlier by Chang Kai-
shek against Shanghai's Communist union-pickets. 
The Chinese Communist Central Committee ordered party members not 
to join this government, but the Comintern Executive Committee reversed 
this decision, thus forcing. the Communists to support policies opposed 
to proletarian interests. 35 . Since Hankow continued the fiction of 
party solidarity, backing Chiang Kai- shek, the Communists also fo 11.owed 
this line, 
In light of Comintern policy, one historian has felt that the 
Chinese Communists were not responsible for the Nanking Incident. 36 
This theory would be correct if there had been strict party discipline, 
but there was not, · As previously pointed out, two Chinese Communist 
factions opposed Comintern policy, and Lin Tsu-han, who arranged the 
Nanking Incident, was a Communist. Lin was a member of the Central 
Committee in 1928, and after 1952 served as Secretary-General of the 
Central China Peoples Government. His action at Nanking was a violation 
of Comintern discipline, and a few months later he again broke disci-
pline and instigated a Communist upri.sing against the Kuomintang at 
Nanchang with the help of several disgruntled Communist officers. 
Only in the riots at Nanking and Nanchang did the Chinese Communists 
34 Brandt, Failure, 129. 
35 Ib'd 
. 1. • 9 94-96. 
36 Isaacs, Traged;z, 144. 
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openly flout Comintern discipline, and on both occasions Lin Tsu-han 
37 
was present, Chinese Communist disapproval of Comintern policy and 
Lin's actions demonstrate the possibility of independent Communist ac-
tion, Thus, the genesis of the Nanking Incident lay in dissatisfaction 
of certain Chinese Communists with both Chiang Kai-shek and the Commu-
nist International. 
Personal rf:!lationships also aided the Communists at Nanking, Lin 
Tsu-han was related by marriage to Sixth Army Commander, Ch'enfi; Ch'.ien 
and exerted tremendous influence over him. In 1949, Lin induced Ch 1 eng 
.to join the Communist cause when Ch'eng held strategic Hunan province, 
which protected the Kuomintang government at Canton, When Ch'eng 
38 
switched allegiances, the Nationalist base on. Mainland China collapsed. 
Ch 1 eng connived with Lin at Nanking for still another reason--out 
of personal rivalry. When Sun Yat-sen was alive, Ch'eng had held high 
rank in the Kuomintang equal to that of Chiang Kai-shek, 39 After Sun 1 s 
death Ch'eng fell to a subordinate position beneath the dominant Chiang. 
The jealous Ch 1 eng joined the opposition at Hankow in consequence and 
after the Nanking Incident he reported to the Kuomintang Headquarters 
d h W h . . 40 an government at t e u an cLties, There he became a member of the 
standing committee of Hankow's military council and later served as one 
of Wuhan 1 s delegates to a special committee promoting party unity when 
37Max Perleberg, Who's Who in Modern China (Hong Kong, Ye Olde 
Printerie, Ltd,, 1954), 135-,- -
38H. L. Boorman, editor, Biographical Dictionary of Republican 
China (New York, Columbia University Press, 1967), I,282, 
39 Tu I . 251 ang, no.er History, , 
4oAbb . . f W h k d 
· reviation or uc ang, Han ow, an Hanyang, 
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Hankow and_Nanking reunited.in September, 1927.· Ch'eng eventually suf-
fered for his disloyalty, and from 1928 to 1932, he underwent house 
arrest for "illegal activities. 1141 
Thus, the execution of Lin's plans at Nanking was apparently. facil-
itated by sharp personal rivalry at the highest military level in the 
.Kuomintang. But, if this was a conspiracy, why were there so many, will-
ing conspirators?, Why did $0 many Kuomintang troops play their assigned 
roles i;;o willingly and so fiercely? Social psychology yields an answer. 
I 
Here was a classic case of the frustration-aggression syndrome. In the 
words of John B. Powell: 
Foreign dealings with Orientals has been signaliz~d by one 
word FORCE, and inall too many instances it has been $igpal-
ized by outright brutalities. So long as.we continue to en-
force our so-called rights in this part. of the world by 
resorting to primitive force, we have no possible grounds 
for being.offended when the Chinese retaliate in kind. The 
Chinese who perpetrated the Nanking brutalities had in them 
all of the age-long stored-up animo.sities of Chinese or 
Orientals toward the white race,42 
.As one of Nanking's missionaries observed, "The ultimate cause of the 
Nanking Incident must be traced to 100 years of Europeanaggression in 
China." 
The Chinese political puzzle.is difficult to assess in historical 
perspective, and it must have been equally perplexing. for United. States 
off'icials and citizens to judge in 1927. What then was the reaction of 
theUnited.States policy-makers, and what were the forces that shaped 
the United States reaction to the Nanking Incident? 
41 Boorman, J;)ictionary, I, 283. 
42china Weekly Review, (May 14, 1927), 273-274. 
CHAPTER IV 
, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE NANKING.INCIDENT 
. The Nanking. Incident aroused the complex public and private foreign 
interests in China, and it created a demand for an effective diplomatic 
response from the·United States. Two responses were possible: a policy 
of demands and threats supported by military reprisal or a policy, of 
conciliation based on an understanding.of the aspirations of Chinese 
Nationalism. Whichever choice the United States. made, it could and did 
alter the fundamental United States China policy. 
American Diplomatic Response 
Word of the Nanking "outrages" created an aura of uneasiness.in 
the Shanghai International Settlement and in other foreign communities 
in China, The Shanghai Japanese Club unanimously petitioned its govern-
ment to take all measures insuring Japan's dignity and the safety of 
J b ' . . Ch' l apanese usiness interests.in ina . The Peking foreign community 
. warned the Powers that any del.;1.y, in action would lead to more violence, 
and.when· the United States government seemed to be temporizing, the 
Shanghai American community telegraphed the same warning to the United 
2 States Secretary of State, Frank B,· Kellogg, 
The foreign diplomats at Peking joined the chorus of those 
1North China Herald, (April 2, 1927), 34. 
2NorthChina Herald, (April 9, 1927), 51. 
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demanding a strong and swift response from the Powers. The ministers 
of the five Powers involved at Nanking--the United States, Great Britain, 
France, Japan, and Italy--·met on March 29, 1927, and proposed that their 
governments present identic notes to Chiang Kai- shek. They sought: 
1. Pun:!.shment of the commanders of the troops and other 
implicated persons responsible for the "murders, per-
sonal injuries, indignities, and material damage" done 
at Nanking, 
2. A written apology by the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Nationalist Army, and 
3. Complete reparation for material damages and personal 
injuries. 
If Chiang Kai-shek failed to respond, the ministers suggested the Powers 
set a time limit for compliance, 3 
The foreign ministers expected united and immediate response from 
their governments, but this was not forthcoming, Japan hesitated about 
4 
adding a time limit to the note, For expediency, the ministers modi-
fied this provision, and by April 1, 1927, all the Powers except the 
United States agreed to send identic notes. 
Secretary of State Kellogg doubted the advisability of any ultima-
tum since failure to negotiate a settlement would lead to hostilities, 
5 but he did feel that a formal demand of some sort was necessary, Amer-
ican Minister to China, J. V. A. MacMurry, exasperated by Kellogg 1 s 
delay" cabled that the proposed note was mild and was not an ultimatum 
implying intervention. 6 
3F· , R 1 ' 1927 166 . 
. orei,g;n e at ions, ·-·=--=' 
4Ibid. " 171. 
5Ibid., 170, 
6Ibid., 173. 
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The British government, headed by the Conservative or "Tory" Party, 
also urged American participation in the presentation of identic notes. 
The Tory's China policy supported foreign priyilege, backed by the 
threat of. sanctions or reprisals which in the past had meant a military· 
expedi:tion of some· sort. Sir Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign 
Secretary, reported the events of Nankingimmediately after the Inci-
dent to the House of Commons. He had hoped to over-awe Parliament with 
the tragic events to gain support for the Conservative policy, but. 
Liberal and Labour Members of Parliament openly questioned the value of 
· 1· ' Ch' 7 mi itary measures. in . ina. 
When Chamberlain indicated that the British cabinet was preparing 
for "strongaction"·in China, the Labourites, under the leadership of 
Ramsay MacDonald, assailed the Conservative position and demanded debate 
on the China question •. The debate took place on April 6, 1927, and 
.LabourM.P. 1 s lambasted the veracity of the government's. statements on 
the Nanking Incident and proposed that Great Britain invite the League 
of Nations to settle the diplomatic problems of the Incident. 8 
The Labour attack served no useful purpose, and the only policy 
concession made by the British government was the omission of the time 
limit to appease Japan and to gain unanimity among the Powers. Great --
Britain still planned sanctions if the Nationalists failed to comply 
with foreign demands, and the British Ambassador to the United States, 
9 Sir Esme Howard,. so informed the United States ,Department of State. 
7London Times, (March 29, 1927), 8. 
8Parliamentary Debates, (London, H. · M. Stationary Office, 1927), 
Volume 204, 2109-2127. 
9Foreign Relations, .. 1927, 179. 
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Sanctions received the support of the foreign military in China 
and won endorsement from the United States Commander-in-Chief of the 
Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Charles S. Williams; Admiral Williams and the 
British, French, and Japanese fleet commanders in the Far East proposed 
a series of military reprisals designed to injure Nationalist prestige 
. if diplomatic action failed. The proposed sanctions included the cap-
ture or destruction of certain Nationalist military bases, or forts, 
and withholding the Shanghai·surtax from the Nationalist government. 
The admirals also considered blockading the portion of China's coast 
held by the.Kuomintang. 
Williams and the other admirals felt that the proposed note was an 
ultimatum, and a rejection of the Powers' terms would demand drastic 
action. They advised alli.ed actionif force became the only alterna-
, . h. . . 10 
t1ve int a crisis. 
Secretary of State Kellogg had yielded to the pressure of the con-
servatives--the diplomats, American businessmen in China, the British 
government--an.d had agreed on April 2, 1927, to the presentation of 
identic notes, but the demand for sanctions shocked Kellogg. · The Ameri-
can government supported moderation and conciliation in solving the 
·Nanking Incident, not force, and Kellogg reiterated this position in 
notes to Great Britain and American Minister,. MacMurray, on· April 5, 
1927. 
The United States position broke the united front of the Powers, 
and when Japan joined the United States in favoring moderation, diplo-
matic action on the identic notes stalled. On April 6, 1927, the 
lOibid., 178. 
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Japanese government delayed the presentation of notes while its consul 
in Shanghai prodded Chiang Kai-shek to initiate diplomatic action, 
Japan had had previous contact with Chiang and felt that he was favor-
ably inclined toward a rapproachment with the Powers. 11 
Japan supported moderation.in China and refused to send troops to 
China after the Nanking Incident, · The Japanese Foreign Minister, Baron 
· Shidehara Kijuro, felt that reprisals were useless since none of the 
different Chinese governmentsj Kuomintang or otherwise, had effective 
political or military control. To discipline one of the Chinese factions 
would not guarantee the safety of foreign interests in other areas of 
China, Since Japan had a large economic stake in China and over 100,000 
ci.tizens there, Shidehara and the Japanese cabinet did not wish to jeop-
ardize Japanese lives and property in a fruitless military expedition, 
Shidehara expected Chiang.Kai-shek to break with the Hankow govern-
ment, and the Japanese Foreign minister did not wish to lessen Chiang's 
opportunities for victory in the power struggle, · Any ultimatum would 
place Chiang in a dilemma, If he accepted the terms of the Powers, he 
would be a coward in the eyes of the Chinese. On the other hand, if 
Chiang rejected an ultimatum, the Powers would be forced to attack the 
·Nationalists, and the Kuomintang moderate wing, represented by Chiang, 
12 
would lose power, 
The Japanese press echoed the Shidehara policy of concilia.tion and 
deemphasized the spectacular aspects of the Nanking Incident, · The Tokyo 
Asahi suggested that American and British accounts of Nanking were 
11Ibid,, 182, 
12Shidehara Kijuro, Gaiko goiunen (Fifty Years of Diplomacy) 
(Tokyo, Yomiuri Shimbusha, 1951), 109-112, 
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exaggerated. 13 The Tokyo Hochi Shimbun opposed any military measures, 
feeling that in a civil war, one must expect violence. In general, the 
Japanese press supported Chiang Kai-shek and hoped he would overthrow 
the Hankow radicals. 14 
Without the support of Japan and the United States, Great Britain 
stood alone among. the Great· Powers supporting .a policy of sanctions. 
Even France avoided a commitment and remained neutral in the diplomatic 
fray. M. Briand, the French Foreign Minister, called for peace in the 
Or~ent, and the French press rallied to this stand. L'Oeuvre supported 
.h 15 C iang Kai-shek, and. Le Peuple editorialized against French interven-
tion ·in China and. called for the recognition of the Kuoll).intang govern-
16 
ment. The French government followed an. individualistic policy and 
sent notes to the Chinese outside of the joint program.recommended by 
the diplomats at Peking. Briand instructed the French minister at Pe-
king to seek reparations from the recognized "Warlord" government and 
the French consul at Shanghai to issue the same protest to Chiang_Kai-
shek. 17 
Because of the division among the Powers, Great Britain waived its 
18 insistence on sanctions on April 9, 1927, and the Powers were able to 
reach agreement on the iden:tic notes. Two days later, on March 11, 
13North China Herald, (April 2, 1927), 34. 
14tondon Times, (March 30, 1927), 16. 
15 L'Oeuvre, (March 27, 1927), 3. 
16 
.Le Peuple, (April 1, 1927), 1. 
17 L'Oeuvre, (April 2, 1927), 1. 
18Foreign: Re lat ions 9 . 19 27 9 185. 
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1927, Nationalist Foreign Minister, Eugene Ch'en, at Hankow and Chiang 
Kai-shek's representative, General Pai Tsung-hsi, at Shanghai received 
h d.f. d 19 t e mo L Le notes. 
The American public reacted with mixed emotions on hearing news of 
the issuance of identic notes, and a sampling of press opinion indicated 
general discontent with the action. The New York World deplored United 
, States involvement in united action, and the Baltimore Sun mirrored this 
opinion but stated that it was fortunate that the note was not an ul-
timatum. The Philadelphia Public Ledger.approved of the notes only 
b h . 10 . 20 d O 1' . 1 h ecause t ere was no tLme 1mLt, an Ln a po Lt1ca cartoon, t e 
Ir 
Washington Post emphasized the different purposes the various. Powers 
had in presenting the notes. Post depicted "Uncle Sam" as seeking 
reasonable damages and future assurances of protection for American life 
and property, while the other Powers were pictured as '1bullies", de-
manding "heavy dainages and punitive sanctions. 1121 
Post was the precutsor of United States China policy throughout 
the crisis period following the Nanking Incident, and in editorials on 
·. March 27 and 28, 1927, it advocated American support for Chiang. Kai- shek 
and non-interference in China's internal problems. According.to the 
.~, a nation must expect excesses in a civil war and can only seek to 
0 • i i 1· 22 protect its cLt zens 1ves, 
After surveying the American press, Kellogg concluded that any 
19Ibid., 189. 
20rbid., 194. 
21w h' P (A ·1 12 1927) 6 as Lngton ~' pr1 , , . 
22washington.Post, (March 27, 1927), 5, and (March 28, 1927), 6, 
52 
drastic action by the government would create a hostile reaction, and 
he so informed American Minister MacMurray. This commitment to modera-
tion, however, came under fire on April 15, 1927, when Eugene Ch'en 
answered the identic notes, There were five separate answers, and ac-
cording to MacMurray, Ch 1 en's replies were "designed to produce delay 
. or disunion among the five interested Powers. 1123 
Ch I e.n promised the United States reparations for damages to the 
United States consulate, but any further payments, apologies, or punish-
ments would only be forthcoming on proof of the guilt of the Nationalist 
government either through government inquiry or an international com-
mission, He emphasized the willingness of the Nationalists to protect 
foreign lives and property in the future but pointed out that the "best 
guarantee for the effective protection of American lives and property 
in China is the removal of the fundamental cause of troubled relations" 
between China and the Powers--the unequal treaties. 24 
The answers to the other Powers differed subtly. The note to Japan 
hinted at a desire for a diplomatic settlement and closed with a hope 
that Japan would not intervene in the Chinese Revolution. The reply to 
France suggested a broader scope of diplomatic discussion to include 
the Shameen Incident of 1925. Ch'en's answer to Great Britain was simi-
lar to the French note and called for an. international investigation of 
the Shameen and Shanghai Incidents of 1925 and the Wan Hsi.en Incident of 
1926. 25 
23Foreign Relations, 1927, 196. 
24Ibid., 192. 
25 Ibid., 195-197. 
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China's foreign business community reacted unfavorably to Ch 1 en 1 s 
"evasive, unresponsive, and unsatisfactory'' replieso At Peking the 
foreign ministers immediately sought a second set of identic notes de-
signed to spell out foreign disapproval of Ch'en's replies and to state 
in no uncertain. terms that the first identic notes were demands, not 
proposals for discussiono By April 20, 1927, all the governments of 
the Powers except the United States had instructed their foreign minis-
ters to proceed with the second noteso 26 
The demand for the second notes clearly challenged Kellogg's policy 
of moderationo In Washington, the debate over the notes fomented a 
minor crisis, and the capital press rumored a possible cabinet shakeup, 
The Washington.~ reported that President Coolidge was considering 
replacing Secretary of State Kellogg with Commerce Secretary, Herbert 
Hoover, an "old China Hand", who was in tune with American business 
interests in China, 27 
This did not occur, for events in China vindicated Kellogg when 
Chiang Kai-shek openly split with the Hankow government and established 
. 1 . 1 N k' 28 a riva capita at an ing, On April 20, 1927, Kellogg informed Great 
Britain of the United States decision to delay overt action in China 
until it was possible to ascertain the direction Chinese Nationalism 
was to follow. 29 
In a speech in New York City on April 25, 1927, at a banquet 
26 Ibid,, 203. 
27w h' P 
.· as ington ost, (April 16, 1927), L 
28Foreign Relations, 1927, 203, 
29 Ibid,, 207, 
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honoring the United Press International, President Coolidge outlined 
.America's commitment in China. He described China as a country "under-
going revolutionary convulsions" and because of these disruptions, 
United States warships were.in China protecting American citizens and 
commerce. He added that the United. States government was pleased.with 
the conciliatory tone of the Nationalist reply to the identic notesj 
and Coolidge closed his speech on a friendly note. 
The friendship of America for China has become proverbial. 
We feel for her the deepest sympathy in these times of her 
distress, We have no disposition to do otherwise than to 
assist and encourage every legitimate aspiration for free-
doms for unity, for the cultivation of a national spirit 
and the realization of a republican form of government, 30 
The American policy. brought a reassessment of the diplomatic situa-
tion. in the capitals of the other Powers. On May 1, 1927, Foreign Min-
ister Briand informed the French National Assembly that France would 
31 
not enter into any further joint declarations on the Nankingincident, 
and on May 3, 1927, British Ambassador Howard informed the United States 
Department of State that Great Britain would not apply sanctions in 
32 light of the division of opinion among the Powers. 
Thus, despite heavy pressure, the United States checked interven-
tion by the Powers. It deviated, ever so slightly, from the standard 
policy of supporting the Chinese government which represented the status 
quo, and assumed a conciliatory stance toward the main force of emerging 
Chinese nationalism. 
30washington Post, (April 26, 1927), 2. 
31china Weekly Review, (May 7, 1927), 247. 
32Foreign Relations, 1927, 216, 
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.Impact - United States Piplomacy 
From the viewpoi.nt of Chin1::1 1 s rela,tions with the United States, the 
Nanking Incident was the critical point of the Chinese Revolution, The 
American decision after the Incident for either intervention or concil-
iation obscured.questions of treaty revision,which had been the impor-
tant factor in· Sino-American relations and forced the United. States to 
decide whe.ther or not to treat, China as a diplomatic equal. · As we have 
seen, this represented a clash between the conservative attitude that 
had created the unequal treaties.and the.moderate attitudewhich sought 
an equal role·for China in the world community. 
Earlier at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, the United 
States had altered in part, its basic China policy. The Nine Power 
Treaty, signed by the United States at the Conference, achieved a policy 
of "coope:rative denial" among the nations with interests in China. This 
meant an end to the individualistic policies of the Powers and to the 
extension of foreign privilege in China. It further implied that China 
was to be given the 11fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity" to 
create a stable and unified government, 
This policy did not mean. the.Powers would grant China "administra-
tive integrity11 by abolishing the unequal treaties which had taken 
China's tariff autonomy and had given the Powers extra-territorial 
rights--the privilege of trying.foreign. criminals in China by consular 
or special courts outside of Chinese jurisdiction. All diplomatic dis-
cussions concerning the unequal treaties 9 thereafter, languished in 
f . 1 d. . 33 ruit ess iscussion. 
33 
· Borg 9 , American Policy 9 11-12. 
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Thus, the Powers continued to compromise China's equality, but 
there were indications that the United States would alter this policy. 
In a rare·statement on United States foreign policy issued on January 
27, 1927, Secretary of State Kellogg offered.China liberal terms in 
resolving the outstanding questions of treaty revision. He expressed a 
readiness to negotiate with any government representative.of the Chinese 
34 people, irrespective of the actions of the other Powers. 
On January 4, 1927, while the Kellogg statement was being formula-
ted, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Relations, Congress-
man G. Porter, introduced a resolution encouraging the President to 
enter into negotiations with China so that, 
henceforth the treaty relations between the two countries 
shall be upon an equal and reciprocal basis and will be such 
as will in no way offend the sovereign dignity of either of 
the parties, or place obstacles in the way of realization, 
either of them or their several national aspirations or of 
maintenanc5 by them of their several legitimate domestic 
policies. 3 
This resolution probably had the support of the Secretary of State and 
was d . d c . 1 . . 36 esigne to test ongressiona opinion. 
After a series of open hearings, the resolution reached the floor 
of the Hot.1se of Representatives in late February,. 1927, The debate 
that followed was vigorous,. the general tenor being in favor of the 
resolution. Congressman D, J. O'Connell (Democrat, Texas) set the tone 
of the affirmative argument, declaring.that the "deplorable conditions" 
existing. in China were the result of the "unfair and unequal" treaties 
34Ibid., 228. 
35 congressional Record., (Washington, United States Printing Office, 
1927), Volume 68, 4386. 
36 Borg, American Policy, 243, 
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through which the Powers, including the United States, had oppressed 
China. After describing the extra-territorial system and the tariff 
controls exercised by the Powers, O'Connell pointed out that the system 
was "the essence of serfdom" and had "no parallel in American annals. 
The restrict.ions on sovereignty should be removed, and China should be 
permitted to work out her own destiny in her own way. 1137 
Those who opposed the resolution did so for procedural reasons, 
charging that Congress should not request the President to negotiate a 
treaty and "set out the terms upon which the House believes.he should 
negotiate such a treaty." Despite these attacks the resolution carried 
. by a wide margin, 262 in favor to 43 opposed, Thus, the House went on 
record as favoring an alteration of United States. China policy. 38 
Shortly thereafter, the Nanking Incident occurred, and as noted, 
the United States acted with moderati.on and conciliation. This proved ~ 
to be a turning point in American policy. A new harmony prevailed be-
tween the United States and the Nationalists, and when the Kuomintang 
united China in June, 1.928, the United States recognized the new govern-
ment and immediately began revising the unequal treaties, 
The Nan.king Incident was resolved in this spirit on March 30, 1928, 
several months before the United States recognized the Nationalist _./ 
regime. The two. governments concluded the settlement with the exchange 
of three notes between General Huang Fu, the new Nationalist Foreign 
Minister, and American Minister to Chi.na, J, V. A. MacMurray. General 
Huang had become the Nationalist Foreign Minister when the Hankow and 
37 congressional Record, Volume 68, 4388. 
38Ibid., 4390. 
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Nanking governments were reunited in late 1927, and Eugene Ch'en fled 
to Soviet Russia. 
In.the first note the Nationalist government expressed "profound 
regret at the insults to the American flag and officials," and for the 
personal injuries and damages to American residents at Nanking. The 
government accepted full responsibility for the event even though the 
Incident "was entirely instigated by the Communists prior to the estab .. 
lishment of the Nationalist government at Nan.king." The Nationalists 
further promised compensation for personal damages and injuries as 
verified by a Sinoa•American commission, 
. In the sedond and third notes, General Huang sought an expression 
of regret from the United. States concerning the bombardment of Socony 
Hill by the ..!il§§..!£! .. and ~.Preston, and.he suggested that further steps 
"be taken fort.he revision of existing t.reat.ies and readjustment of out-
standing questions on the basis of equality and mutual respect for ter-
i i 1 . i .,39 r tor a sovere gnty, 
Prior to the preparation of these three notes 9 the Nationalist 
government on March 16, 1928, issued two mandates stating that it had 
executed nineteen soldiers.implicated in Nanking disorders.in ad<lition 
. to thirty-two other "local desperadoes" and had ordered the arrest of 
Lin Tsu~han, the instigator of the Incident, · These actions fulfilled 
the demands of the.Powers for "adequate punishment" of those responsible 
for the Nan.king Incident. 40 
39Papers. Relating . .!:£. the Foreign Relations. of. the. United States, 
.1928, (Washington, U1;1ited States Printing Office, 1942), Volume·2, 331-
333. This volume hereafter referred to as Foreign Relations, .1928. 
40R. T. Pollard, China's Foreign Relations (New York, MacMillan 
Company, 1933), 339. 
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MacMurray accepted the notes and acknowledged their receipt on the 
same day. In reply he sent three notes stating that the United States 
agreed to the Chinese~sponsored provisions, but he avoided apology for 
the gunboat barrage by stating that the American government deplored 
"that circumstances beyond its control, should have necessitated the 
adoption of such measures for the protection of the lives of its citi-
zens at Nanking. 11 Mac.Murray further signified United States interest 
in treaty revision when China had "an administration ... representative 
of the Chinese people ... and exercising real authority, as to be capable 
of assuring the actual fulfillment in good faith of any obligations such 
as China would of necessity have for its part to undertake incidentally 
to the desired readjustment of treaty relations. 1141 
Such a government soon existed when Nationalist troops entered 
,// 
Peking in June, 1928, and drove out the last of warlord Chang Tso-lin's 
troops. True to his government's word, Secretary of State Kellogg in-
structed Mac.Murray to commence conversations with the Nationalist 
authorities "with the view to revision of tariff provisions of our 
treaties." The United States was willing to accede to the annulment of 
all provisions of treaties "relating to rates of duty upon the importa-
tion and exportation of merchandise, drawback and tonnage dues in China." 
In turn China was to agree to abolish "likin.11 or intern.al taxes on Amer-
. d d . Ch ' v • • 4 2 1.can goo s transporte 1.n · 1.na s · 1.nt.en.or. 
Mac.Murray opened negotiations on July 11, 1928, with the National-
ist Minister for Finance 0 • T. V. Soong 0 and on July 21, 1928, they 
41Foreign Relations, 1928 9 331-333. 
42Ibid., 449-451. 
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reached agreement on a proposed text of a treaty. They did not work 
out satisfactory terms concerning the abolishment of likin, but on the v 
·whole the treaty terms met the specifications of the Department of 
State, and on July 25, the treaty was signed. 43 
· The trend toward moderation continued, and the United States of-
ficially recognized the·Nationalist government in September, 1928, 44 
after which informal discussions concerning the abolition of extra-
territo'.!'.'iality, opened in: ~ovember, 1928. 45 The United. States was the 
first nation granting recognition and voluntary revision in its treat-
ies with Nationalist China. · The Nanking Incident was not the origin of 
these changes, but it had forced.American decision-makers. to act when 
a t:ti tude s were changing, and thus,. it became a turning point for United 
. States' China policy. 
This new policy repudiated the militaristic and interventionist 
aspects. of foreign imperialism, but the United. States. had not ordinar-
ily used force in China. Protestant missionaries, often. labeled the 
46 
. "cultural arm of Western· ImperiaH.sm," had expanded. American influ-
ence through a variety of educational and chatitable. ins.titu.tions, and 
they had been the chief beneficiaries of the traditional foreign policy 
in China. At Nanking in 1927, the missionaries bore the brunt of the 
attack. How then did they respond to the Incident? 
43 
· .Ibid., 455-477. 
44Ibid., 198-199. 
45Borg,. American: Policy, 412. 
46c. Cary-Elwes,. China and the Cross (New York, Kennedy and Sons, 
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CHAPTER V 
CULTURAL IMPACT: PROTESTANT MISSIONS 
AND LITERATURE 
Theological issues divided the Protestant missionary movement in 
China, and this fact tempered the impact of, the Nanking Incident, After 
World War I, two missionary factions developed in China: the fundamen-
talists and the liberals. The fundamentalists were convinced that lib-
eralism or "modernism" threatened the Church in China, and in 1920, 
they organized under the name of the Bible Union. In the Union's state-
ment of faith, they expressed unqualified adherence to belief in the 
deity of Christ, his Virgin birth, atonement for sin, and bodily resur-
rection. They accepted without qualification the miracles of the Old 
and New Testament, and they believed the Bible was "the inspired Word 
of C:od and the ultimate authority for Christian faith and practice." 
The Union "declared war 11 on all those that differed with its views and 
sought to influence home mission boards to support financially and to 
send only those who ascribed to its particular at'ticles of faith. 1 
Generally, the fundamentalists were apolitical and devoted their 
energies to evangelism and the salvation of Chinese souls. Economic 
and social problems of peasants and workers were not their concern. 
On the other hand, Christian humanism influenced the liberals or 
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"modernists", who placed greater emphasis on the social aspects of 
Christian teaching. To this end the liberals dominated the educational 
sector of missionary enterprise, sought improvement of working condi-
tions in treaty port factories, and encouraged rural development through 
' d . k 2 cooperatLves an extensLon wor . 
They were also the first to notice the injustices of the unequal 
treaties and the wrongs of foreign domination of the Church_ in China. 
Seeking to cure these ills, the liberals organized the National Christian 
Council in 1924~ Liberal missionary leaders such as Frank Rawlinson, 
editor of the Chinese Recorder, argued for an indigenous church, and by 
1926, NCC membership was 75 per cent Chinese. 3 The native episcopasy 
was more in tune with Chinese· Nationalism, and_ it shaped the increasing-
ly moderate pronouncements of the NCC. 
The more conservative mission groups. such as the China Inland Mis-
sion began to withdraw from the NCC in light of its swelling liberalism, 
and by 1927, the fundamentalists.had awakened to the strength of the 
influence of their liberal brethern in diplomatic, political, and mis-
sion-affairs. The events ofMarch and April, 1927, provided a perfect 
moment for conservative missionaries to counter-attack and present their 
viewpoints. 
The many Protestant missionaries, sympathetic with the Nationalist 
cause, had suffered heavy financial losses in the anti-foreign attack 
at Nanking, and in the wave of anti-foreignismbefore and after Nanking, 
many other.missionaries stationed.in the interior had similar tragic 
4Paul A. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats (Princeton, 
_Princeton' University Press, 1958), 215-217 .-
~Ibid., 204-205. 
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tales to tell. Of the 8000 foreign missionaries stationed in China in 
January, 1927, 5000 fled China during the hectic days of March and April, 
1927, Of the 3000 remaining_behind, more than.2500 crowded into Shang-
hai and the other treaty ports for protection. 4 They were a disillu-
sioned people, The Presbyterian ForeignMission Board summed up their 
attitude: 
The year 1927 will be remembered as an outstanding one in 
the history of Christian Missions in China. The words 
tragedy, disillusionment, disappointment, discouragement, 
doubt, uncertainty, perplexity have been heard constantly 
in speaking of the events of the year,5 
In.Hght of the frustration of the moderates, thirty-two conserva-
tive missionaries took the opportunity to attack the National Christian 
Council for taking the lead in treaty revision and as the spokesman for 
the majority of Protestant groups in China. These men, major leaders 
of Protestantism in China, charged that the National Christian Council 
was departing from its constitutionally assigned-functions and engaging 
. l' . 6 1.n po 1.tics, 
China's foreign business community was gleeful over the division 
among the missionaries, This "interventionist ori.ented 11 group realized 
that the .Protestant missionaries strongly influenced the Powers, partic-
ularly the United States, against their cause, Therefore, the treaty 
port press, notably the British-owned North China Herald, exaggerated 
the denunciation of the NCC, hoping to villify it in the eyes of the 
4A, H, Gregg, China and Educational Autonomy (Syracuse, Syracuse 
University Press, 1946), 146. 
5 Borg, American Policy, 363, 
6 North China Herald, (April 16, 1927), 120, 
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.American public. . The Herald had long ~intainE!ld th.at the NCC was not 
a representative body of-missionary opinion, and the attack by a dis-
tinguished group of Protestant leaders provided proof of this conten-
. 8 ti.on. 
A few missionary groups rallied to the Nationalist cause, but these 
were the exception, not the rule. The North China Mission in Peking 
cabled home in April, 1927, that it opposed American militaryinterven-
tion in China and continued to agitate for t~eaty revision. It further 
advocated that missionaries on furlough in the United States work to 
counterat:t the sensational news coming from China and "encourage optim-
ism.regarding Chinese Nationa,lism." 
I1n May, 19-27, the National Council of Congregational Churches ex-
pres~ed approval of the United States response to the Nanking Incident 
and confidence in the. American policy of ''independent action, non-
ii;itervention, and constructive friendliness." Similarly,. the American 
Baptist Forei~n Mission Society resolved in early April, 1927, to ''re-
emphasize its stand for the unity and sovereignty of the Chinese people 
and against foreign aggression '.in China, 119 . 
Thus, the declaration against tbe NCC in April, 1927, brought the 
fundamentalist-modernist split to public view. · For the next few years, 
Protestant leaders in the United States and China continued to bicker, 
7 . 
Ibid,, 105. 
8 . . 
China Week1Y, Review, (April 30, 1927), 219. Editor J. B. Powell 
sarcastically noted that the thirty=two missionaries denouncing.the 
National Christian Council for political activity had cabled the Ameri-
can government demanding intervention after the Nanking Incident. 
9 Borg, American Policy, 365. 
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but their debate was futile. The open division within Protestantism 
weakened the diplomatic influence of the missionary in the United States, 
and in China, the rise of nationalism changed the structure and the 
message of the Church. 
The act:Lve Chinese clergy gained the leadership of the Protestant 
Church in Ch:l.na 1 and these new leaders were not in sympathy with the 
dogmatic approach of the foreign missionary. Further, Christian schools 
lost most of their religious content as new government regulations al-
tered curricula and introduced native administrators, 
The transfer of the Church leadership from foreign missionary to 
native clergy, re.ferr.ed to as devolution, was a nominal goc1l of the 
missionary and had been discussed for many years, But foreign concern 
for this matter was actually indifferent, More devolution took place 
in a few weeks of 1927 9 than in any previous decade, lO When the mission-
ary retuined to his post in China after the anti-foreign scare subsided, 
he found the native clergy firmly in power with the support of the 
Nationalist go·,Ternment, The new regime specified that all administra-
tors in foreign institutions must be Chinese and that half the members 
f b d f b . 11 o · any oar o.: trustees must e natives. 
Sinification of the Protestant movement created training problems 
since the new Chinese administrators were not well versed in dogma and 
were not adequately prepared to assume their new responsibilities. The 
new Chinese clergy had less training and were not well grounded in 
theology. They were less dogmatic than their foreign peers and had 
10 Gregg 9 Autono111L 155, 
11varg 9 Missionaries 9 210. 
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evangelical tendencies, emphasizing. increased social work or modernism, 
d . h d 1 d h · h C · 12 an Ln many cases t ey eve ope sympat y wLt ommunLsm, 
The decline of theological seminaries demonstrates the decreased 
interest in theology. In.1922, there had.been fifty such institutions 9 
but by 1932, five seminaries had become secular colleges, and only nine-
13 teen theological schools remained, the rest having closed their doors. 
In other areas of activity, the mis.sion school system underwent 
change. Nationalism, generated in the Chinese Revolution, spurred 
Chinese students to form Student Unions. Through these new. organiza-
tions, students demanded a. share in school administration and new cur-
ricula, devoid of required religious instruction and emphasizing the 
social and natural sciences. 
As an example, students at Yale College of Changsha demanded the 
abolition of chapel, complete freedom on Sundays, and elimination of 
religious ceremonies in daily assemblies. No students were to be dis-
missed without the assent of a Student Union which was to be subsidized 
by the school. Students were to have the right to dismiss instructors 
through a student vote. Although the school received 80 per cent of 
its funds from the United States and only, 20 per cent from fees, the 
Student Union demanded lower tuition rates and the building of a gym-
nasium, 14 , When the college failed to meet these demands in full, the 
students went on strike. The school eventually closed because of what 
were considered unreasonable demands, noting: 
12 
· Cary-Elwes, Cross 9 256. 
13Ibid., 258. 
14china Year, Book, (1928), 500. 
that they were furnishing something which many of the stu-
dents could get in no other way, a fairly. decent education, 
at no cost to student or government. If the students did 
not care to attend their institutions they were at perfect 
liberty to go elsewhere, if they could.15 
67 
The Nationalist Ministry of Education followed student leadership 
and created a school registration system which implemented student de-
16 
mands. The government made military training a part of mission school 
17 
curricula and replaced chapel services with Sun Yat-sen services. 
·Although.Protestant mission schools such as Yale College at Changsha 
· had at first balked at the new. regulations and registration system, by 
1932, the government specified curricula was in general use, and ac-
cepted by the missionaries, and the student unions helped in school 
18 
administration, often producing school news papers. 
Compliance with the new government regulations meant an end.to the 
effective use of the mission school .in proselytizing. · As an example, 
in 1934~ only 2000 of the 6700 students in mi.ssion colleges claimed to 
be Christians, and only 1200 were from Christian homes. 19 The large 
percentage of non ... Christians could not be reached since religious pro-
grams were voluntary. A study of seventeen mission schools in 1929 
demonstrated the failure of such voluntary programs. In boys schools, 
29.8 per cent attended chapel services and 18.8 per cent Sunday services. 
Girls school figures were higher with 72.7 per cent attending chapel 
15 tbi.d. 
16c. H. Peake, Nationalism and-Education in Modern China (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1932"5':-152. -
17 Ibid., 136, 153. 
18China_Year Book, (1933), 281. 
19China Year _Book, (1936),. 356. 
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and 54~9 per cent attending Sunday services. Courses in religion had 
. similar low attendence figures with 36.6 per cent of the boys electing 
courses and 64.5 per cent of the girls. 20 
Thus, change--the change in the quality of the Protestant message 
:ln China-·~is the most apparent aspect of the impact of the Nanking 
Incident on the "cultural arm" of imperialism, Inspiration as well as 
change also stemmed from the tragedy and touched another cultural force, 
. American literature. 
Impact - American Literature 
Two of America's foremost novelists on China, Pearl S. Buck and 
Alice T. Hobart, were among those trapped at Nanking, and both authors 
have incorporated some elements of the tragedy into their writing. Mrs, 
Buck, the 1938 Nobel Prize winner for Literature, was a Presbyterian 
mi.ssionary and a teacher at Nanking University in 1927, . On the day of 
the Incident, she and her family heard of the Nationalist attack and 
death of De J. E. Williams, and they escaped to the home of a Chinese 
friend before the arrival of troops and looters. 21 The rabble thorough.., 
ly wrecked her home and destroyed a just-completed manuscript of her 
first novel. This story 9 a tale about the life of an American man and 
woman in China, was never rewritten. 
Mrs, Hobart, wife of the Standard Oil Company manager at Nanking, 
was one of two women trapped at the Standard Oil house on Socony Hill. 
As previously mentioned, she and fifty-one other foreigners escaped 
20 Varg, Missionaries, 211. 
21 Pearl S. Buck, l1Y, Several Worlds (New York, John Day, Co., 1954), 
204'-210. 
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over Nankingus wall when the foreign gunboats shelled Nationalist troops 
who were attacking Socony Hill. 
These two womenus experiences.at Nanking has provided material for 
their various books and short stories, · Their outlooks differed, how-
ever. Pearl Buck doubts that the Nanking Incident affect~d her writ~ 
ing, 22 but it has served as a vehicle to express ber strong identifica-
tion with.Chinaus peasantry, 11The Revolutionist," a short story pub-
lished in 1928 in which she depicted the motivating force creating the 
looters at Nanking, is a case in point. 
The story's protaganist is a destitute Chinese farmer, named Wang 
Lung. He often went to Nanking to sell farm produce and on one such 
occasion heard the speeches of young revolutionists. Wang could not 
understand their high,~minded ideas~ but t:he slogan-·M"The poor shall 
become rich 1 "~·~ sti:i:·:i:·ed his imagination, Povei:·t:y,ti stricken and destitute, 
. Wang desired the comforts of wealth, so he shaved his head in the revo-
lut:ionary style in hopes o.f obtaining the promised wealth, As revolu-
tionary troops approached Nanking, fifth column.ists aroused Wangu s greed 
with tales of foreign wealth, and when Nanking fell, he participated in 
anti·~ foreign looting. He collected only a 1i ttle money and some inci-
dentals and came to realize that revolutionary slogans do not cure 
23 poverty. 
Pearl Buckus sympathy for China's poor is double-edged, and the 
real victim of the Nanking Incident becomes the revolutionists, who lost 
the common touch and could not aid the peasantry. Buck I s apprecia;tion 
22 Pearl S. Buck to author, April 23, 1968. 
23Pearl S. Buck,. "The Revolutionist,!! Asia, XXIII, (September, 1928), 
685-689i 752-756, 
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of the lot and life of Chinavs poor farmers dominates her China novels, 
but the Nanking Incident is the focal point of her expression of sym-
pathy in these stories and appears incidentally in two of her novels. 
In The.Good Earth, Buck recreates Wang Lung in the role of a North 
China farmer who flees to Nanking to avoid famine. Again, he hears 
revolutionary propaganda and joins a mob of looters, but the message of 
"The Revolutionist" is lost. Wang and his wd.fe, 0-lan, use their booty 
to return to North China and become wealthy landholders. 24 
. The Nanking Incident reappears in A.House Divided, the third book 
of the so-called House of Earth trilogy, The central figure is Wang 
Lung's grandson, a sensitive figure caught in the maelstrom of changing 
China. Yuan, as he is named, goes to America to study,. where in his 
loneliness,. he forgets China's troubles and poverty and remembers only 
the fine qualities of his homeland, The disorders of the Chinese Revo-
lution and the anti-foreign riots at Nan.king destroy Yuan's idealized 
world, and he returns to face the challenges of changing China. 25 
Thus, the Nan.king Inc:i.dent becomes a literary device, a "deus ex 
machina," facilitating.the flow of Pearl Buckvs narrative tales of Chi-
nese society 1 s lowest common denominator. Here is the contrast between 
Pearl Buck and Alice Hobart, for the Nanking Incident had a far reaching 
impact on Mrs. Hobart, 
Her husband, Earle T, Hobart, had been a hero at Nanking, but his 
fall from the city wall permanently crippled him, and he was demoted by 
24 ( ) 
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Standard Oil in the wake of a major company reorganization, Hobart's 
demotion meant a return to an interior station, instead of a Shanghai 
office position that he was to receive before the Nanking Incident oc-
curred. He resigned rather than face the menace of anti-foreignism in 
the interior, and the family returned to the United States shortly there-
26 
after. 
The tragic effects of the Nanking Incident deeply impressed Alice 
.Hobart and touched her writing. She was writing her first novel,~ 
Supreme, when the Incident occurred, and the arrival of the two signal-
men from the USS . .1'12! interrupted her writing in the middle of a. state-
ment by the story's hero, Eben Hawley. · Wh.en she finally resumed writing 
her novel several months later, she reread her fialf-written statement, 
"I'll tell. ye right now, me and my sons are going to stick it out even 
if a whole string of generals ••. ", and realized that, 
I was not the same person who had written those words. This 
could no longer be the romantic story of adventure.I origin-
ally intended it to be, I saw Eben Hawley held tragic mean-
ing for both East and West.27 
From that point Alice Hobart wrote of the conflict between East 
and West, and thisis the theme inher three principal novels on China, 
Supreme, Eben Hawley's steamers, operating through the Yangtze Gorges, 
jeopardized the livelihood of the traditional junkmen. Oilman Stephen 
Chase in Oil for the Lamps of China brought to China impersonal ideas 
of Western organized business which clashed with the principles of human 
· 
26 Alice T. Hobart, Gusty's. Child (New York, Longmans Co., 1959), 
235-243, 
27 Ibid. , 246, 
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relations embodied in Confucian philosophy. 28 In. Yang and Yin, a young 
missionary doctor, Peter Frazier, found that Oriental fatalism closed 
the minds of his students to the speculative thinking of Western sci-
29 
ence. 
Besides affecting her attitude about China and the West, the Nan-
king Incident provided Alice Hobart with subject matter for a book and 
an article. Within the Walls of Nanking is Mrs, Hobart's personal ac-
count of the events leading up to the Incident and.what occurred on 
· Socony Hill during the riots. Hobart also edited letters sent home to 
relatives during the crisis period, and these letters were published in 
Harper's under the title, "What Happened at Nanking. 1130 
Thus, the Nanking Incident had a diversified impact, providing not 
only change, but also stimulation. To the literary genius of two of 
America's novelists, it provided inspiration,. and the background-for 
expression. 
28Ibid., 275. 
29 Ibid., 289-290. 
30Alice T. Hobart, "What Happened at Nanking," Harper'sMonthly 
Magazine, CXL, July, 1927, 143-148. 
SUMMARY 
The Chinese Revolution of 1926-1928, stirred the powerful national-
ist forces seeking to remold Chinao The Nanking Incident of March 24, 
1927, occurring at the chronological and geographic midpoint of the 
Kuomintang Northern Expedition, was a catalyst, releasing these latent 
forces and exposing three basic conflicts: 
lo It brought to a crisis the conflict between the forces 
within the Chinese Nationalist Movement over its leader-
ship and goals. 
The two parties of the Chinese Revolution~ the Kuomintang and the 
Chinese Communists, had split internally. Within the Kuomintang person-
al rivalries fractured the party, and questions of strategy and ideology 
divided the Chinese Communists. 
The Chinese Revolution also divided the social classes over whether 
the Revolution was to bring a political or social change to China. 
Chiang Ka.i-shek soon demonstrated that the settlement was primarily 
political, and power transferred from one military faction, the war-
lords, to the military dictatorship of the Kuomintango This settlement 
did not satisfy China's "exploited classes," the peasants and laborerso 
As long as the "exploiters" of Chinese society, the military, landlords, 
and compradors, continued to hold the keys to power, the Revolution in 
' China was not complete as Mao Tse-tung proved in 19490 
2o The Nanking Incident exposed the conflict within the 
13 
Protestant missionary movement over the structure and 
message of Protestantism in China. 
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There were two factions in the Protestant foreign missionary move-
ment, the fundamentalists and modernists. They disagreed on the content 
of the Christian message, the role of the native clergy, and the future 
of the Chinese nation. 
Although in the past, the foreign missionary had played the major 
role in Protestant China, neither faction controlled the destiny of 
Protestantism in China after the Nan.king Incident of 1927. Nationalism 
and anti-foreign.ism transferred control of the movement to the native 
clergy. They in turn loosened theological ties, and the message of 
Protestantism absorbed the less dogmatic concepts of social Christianity 
and evangelism. 
3. The Nanking Incident heightened the conflict among the 
Powers and their constituents over the role of China 
in the interna tiona 1 cornmuni ty, 
Questions about China's role in the world divided the various for-
eign interests in China into two groups; the conservatives and the mod-
erates. The Nanking Incident forced the Powers to commit themselves to 
either a conservative or moderate position. 
The United States had wavered between these two postures since the 
Washington Conference of 1922, but finally, adopted the moderate course, 
the untested path of diplomacy, There were no guarantees that the 
Nationalists and Chiang Kai-shek could be trusted or that a Kuomintang 
government would protect foreign lives and property in China, Never-
theless~ the United States supported moderation and swung the other 
Powers behind this stance for the moment. 
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That the United States should repudiate the traditional path of 
cliplomacy when China was in chaos, was only common sense in the eyes of 
many Americans. The words of Oklahoma's favorite son, Will Rogers, 
exemplify this attitude. 
China! Those poor people! They have lived within their own 
boundaries, never invaded anyone else's domains,.worked hard, 
got little pay for it, had no pleasures in life, learned us 
about two-thirds of the useful things we do, and now they 
want to have a Civil War .. Now we had one and nobody butted 
in and told us we couldn't have it. China did not send gun-
boats up our Mississippi River to protect their laundries 
at Memphis or St. Louis or New Orleans. They let us go ahead 
and fight. If a package of shirts got. pierced by a bullet, 
and it made holes in the wrong place the poor China man had 
to make it good himself. His country did not send warships 
to protect his washboard. If they rendered up his flat irons 
into cannon.balls and heaved them at each other, China did 
not demand restitution.l 
Will, in his own homespun way, argued for moderation and echoed Secre-
tary of State Kellogg's attitude on China. 
1china:Weekl_y Review, (April 23, 1927), 201. 
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